Self-Regard and Other-Regard: Reflexive Practices in American Psychology, 1890–1940

The Argument

Psychology has been frequently subjected to the criticism that it is an unreflexive science—that it fails to acknowledge the reflexive properties of human action which influence psychologists themselves as well as their subjects. However, even avowedly unreflexive actions may involve reflexivity, and in this paper I suggest that the practices of psychology include reflexive ones. Psychology has an established tradition of silence about the self-awareness and self-consciousness of its actors, whether those actors are experimenters, theorists, or participants (subjects) in research, yet this silence has been established and maintained through sophisticated exercises in self-regard—through sustained reflexive work. Historical analysis reveals some of the ways in which psychologists recognized and then neglected, covered over, or denied reflexivity. Study of those instances where psychologists have engaged in self-conscious reflection or have attended to the self-consciousness of research subjects indicates both the dangers of reflexivity to governing investigative practices and the resilience which psychology has built against reflexive work. Canonized procedures for scientific work reproduce selves of experimenters and subjects alike, selves who acknowledge only part of their reflexive engagements. Historians of psychology have a special opportunity (and obligation) to explore the reflexive dynamics of investigative practices, and, hence, to theorize about *scientists*, along with their actions and interactions, just as we theorize about science, its products, and its evolution.

Within science itself prejudice is by no means absent. Men of science are only a little less human than the ordinary run of mankind.

Pratt 1939, 40

Carol Pratt’s diagnosis of the mental life of psychologists was a harsh indictment: not only are psychologists qua scientists “a little less human” than the lay population, they are also sorely wanting in objectivity, competence, and rationality. Only a small proportion of mankind escapes these cognitive incapacities and “possesses” a reasonably detached and objective outlook on life (ibid., 59).

Readers familiar with American psychology of the 1920s and 1930s will recognize Pratt’s comments as illustrative of the invectives launched in this brief era of contending
schools and systems, when harassment and name calling were common. Some critics took aim at the psychologist-entrepreneur who "swells up with a practical, non-academic idea which is going to solve some vast problem, and then spatters the rest of us disagreeably when he blows up" (Dunlap 1929, 202). Other writers targeted particular theories; behaviorism and psychoanalysis were frequent objects of these attacks (e.g., Williams 1931). More often, however, commentators attributed the disunity of psychology to emotional characteristics of "homo psychologicus." Whether they thought the problem was due to "cultish beliefs" that inhibited scientific thinking, to selfish bickering, and egocentrism, or to the immaturity of psychologists, there was general concurrence that psychologists needed to behave differently (Calkins 1925; Jastrow 1927; Pillsbury 1922; Ruckmick 1937; Smith 1931). As a corrective, writers urged greater solidarity and cooperation within the psychological society and frequently suggested psychological improvements in psychologists (see Morawski 1986; Sokal 1984). For Harvey Carr, the solution was simple: "We psychologists should strive to make our science respectable, but we must first achieve self-respect, and to do so we must cease from relying on extraneous props and learn to stand squarely upon our own scientific feet" (Carr 1937, 296). Lack of self-respect, Carr speculated, may account for psychologists' defensive scientism and their consequent need to "convince ourselves and others that we are being much more scientific than we really are" (ibid., 295).

Although psychologists may have lacked self-respect, as Carr suggested, they nevertheless exhibited a self-absorbed regard—a keen awareness of their position and actions as psychologists. During the competitive years of contending theories and systems, that self-regard, which was often turned outward toward fellow psychologists, was vividly exhibited in psychologists' textual practices, both in public documents and in private correspondence. While historians of psychology have described the period, this peculiar moment of self-regard, as one of heated controversy punctuated with verbal wrestling and mud-slinging, the relations between these self-reflexive practices and psychologists' formal theorizing have gone unexamined.

Until recently, historians of the natural sciences have found little need to address reflexivity, particularly when it is defined as the property whereby the subject who undertakes inquiry shares characteristics with the object of that inquiry. When reflexivity is defined in terms of self-regard or self-awareness, historians of the natural sciences might or might not take an interest in this practice. But historians of psychology surely cannot afford to ignore either form of reflexive practice. Whether reflexivity is seen as a relation between theory and theorist or simply as a researcher's self-awareness, it involves certain psychological conceptions of self and mental life: reflexive thinking is more than introspective contemplation, for it requires that persons, in this case psychologists, engage in reflection with already present notions of what they are or might become (Doyal and Harris 1986). Reflexive acts, then, involve modes of human understanding, and a science that seeks to understand self and social life has a special need to take into account the multiple manifestations of human nature that transpire in its scientific practices. As we shall see, psychologists have at times exhi-

bited a peculiar recognition of this condition, in that they have sometimes relied on reflexive means to dismiss reflexivity. Although historians of psychology have investigated some of the ways in which psychological theory mirrors cultural patterns (see Plagman 1981) and encompasses certain a priori notions of human subjectivity (see Smith 1988), there have been practically no studies that evaluate the development of the science in relation to construals of the psychological knower or psychologist's self. To understand these latter enactments of reflexivity within psychology, we must not only conceptualize the various forms and implications of reflexive practices in general, but also reconsider our conventional historiography. This paper first explores forms of reflexivity and identifies some historiographical concerns regarding the recovery of reflexive practices. The paper then offers several historical moments when reflexivity, particularly reflexive self-regard, enabled psychologists better to secure their claims to veridical knowledge about the mental processes of other humans.

**Reflexive Practices: Intended, Dismissed, or Denied**

During the last two decades the term "reflexivity" has enjoyed multiple lives: it has been extended to describe a general property of social action, to explain the functioning of science and social science, and to develop new literary theories. In its most general sense reflexivity is defined as "a turning back on oneself, a form of self-awareness" or self-regard (Lawson 1985, 9). When applied to intellectual activities where the objects of inquiry are humans or human characteristics, reflexivity is typically defined as the self-referential quality of theory. Here reflexivity is "an aspect of all social science, since any statement which holds that humans act or believe in particular ways under particular circumstances refers as much to the social scientist as to anyone else" (Grunberg 1978, 322). In this understanding of the concept, the social scientist is inescapably implicated in reflexive activities and, hence, is at risk of becoming entangled in the paradoxes that frequently accompany those practices. Yet another definition of reflexivity concerns the relation between reality and accounts of reality—that back-and-forth process whereby an account of reality depends on preexisting knowledge of what the account refers to, and vice versa (Ashmore 1989; Woolgar 1988). In this last sense of the concept, all scientists, not just those in the human sciences, are imbricated in reflexive practices, as they produce observational accounts of objects in the world that are influenced by their already existing understanding of those objects.

Given these definitions, reflexivity may be either an intended or an unintended property of social science; it may be desired or scorned, elaborated or denied. Recent discussions of reflexivity have provided a critical appreciation of how reflexive practices, even when they are neglected or unnoticed, are a constitutive feature of social science. These critical studies attend primarily to reflexivity as the (unavoidable) self-referential property of social theories; they usually proceed by analyzing those theories which do not acknowledge reflexivity and which thus fail to account for the
social processes of making theories, even when they purport to explain social processes. Social science that is reflexive in this manner confronts a troublesome paradox. For instance, sociologists of science who seek to uncover the social (essentially non-scientific) bases of scientific work have been found to face, or have found themselves facing, reflexive questions about the social bases of their own supposedly scientific work (Grunenberg 1978; Mulray 1984; Woolgar 1988a). In this case, while scientists are being investigated for their lack of reflexive self-awareness (of the social or cultural dimensions of their science), the sociologists of science who employ standard empirical methods apparently eschew their own self-awareness, for they fail to acknowledge how their theories of the social bases of science can refer back to their own empirical studies. Sociologists of science who attend to these reflexive conditions, and there are now a number of researchers who do so (see Ashmore 1989), ultimately must consider reflexivity as it is manifested in two subject groups: the scientists whom they study and themselves (Furman and Oehler 1986; Oehler and Mullins 1986).

As illustrated in the reflexive sociology of science, critical studies of reflexivity, although initially aimed at identifying and critically analyzing reflexive practices that have gone unnamed, have moved toward positive or constructive studies of reflexivity. Here reflexivity is not construed simply as a problem but as a possibility for social science. Alvin Gouldner earlier (1970) called for a “reflexive sociology” that would utilize a methodology derived from the subject awareness of the sociologist, from a recognition of the mutual constitution of subject and observer. Anthony Giddens (1979) has advocated sociological theory that acknowledges the recursive awareness of the object of theory, the ordinary actor. Reflexivity, in Giddens’ model, is “understood not merely as ‘self-consciousness’ but as the monitored character of the ongoing flow of social life” (Giddens 1979, 3; see also Wolf 1986). In these positive projects, reflexivity is embraced as a means toward either more inclusive or more accurate theorizing, for it incorporates a previously neglected feature of social life, specifically the back-and-forth monitoring of self and other, which occurs in theoretical practices just as it does in everyday life.

Any move toward acknowledging reflexivity, whether critical or positive, poses substantial epistemological and methodological consequences. First, acknowledgment of the reflexive properties of research can result in an uncomfortable paradox. For instance, if reflexivity is taken seriously, then programs like logical positivism, which asserts that only empirically verifiable statements are meaningful, must be able to demonstrate the empirical verifiability of that statement — which, of course, cannot be done (Lawson 1985, 19). Employing reflexive methods similarly can lead to infinite regress, whereby the observer, caught in a hall of mirrors, looks reflexively at the reflexive observations of other observers, and so on (see Ashmore 1989; Woolgar 1988a). Finally, in addition to the problems of paradox and infinite regression, there is the challenge that thinking about reflexivity poses to representation, a foundational tenet of modern science. That is, taken to its farthest, reflexive analysis ultimately questions the assumed independence of the act of representation and the object to be represented, since “the character of the representation, as perceived by the actor, changes to accommodate the perceived nature of the underlying reality, and the latter simultaneously changes to accommodate the former” (Woolgar 1988b, 33). When reflexive analysis is thus extended to investigate the nature of representation, we confront deeply established assumptions about the independence of the observer and the world, of subject and object.

Whether taken as simple self-awareness — as self-referential theorizing — or as the nonindependence of representations and the reality represented, a reflexive stance appears to challenge the very foundations of psychological research. In brief, the idea of reflexive self-awareness places in question reigning assumptions about objective observers. Insisting on the self-referential nature of theorizing undermines psychologists’ working belief that they have better access to psychological reality than do their subjects; it also challenges a plethora of psychological theories on human irrationalities that, if applied to psychologists themselves, would render their theories suspect if not invalid. The even stronger versions of reflexivity undoubtedly would raise all of these doubts, and additional ones, about the possibility of veridical psychological knowledge.

There is considerable evidence that psychologists have resisted taking such stances. Repeated claims about the reflexive qualities of human experimentation either have been systematically dismissed (Suls and Rosnow 1988) or, at best, have led researchers to the paradoxical position of conducting experiments on the experimental situation (Gadlin and Ingle 1975). Initiatives for self-awareness in psychologies of self have gone unheeded (Holland 1977). Even feminist psychologists who have become aware of deep connections between researchers and their objects of inquiry and of the male-reflections that are constitutive of science (see Harding 1986; Keller 1985; Merchant 1980) have restricted their reflexive scrutiny to manageable methodological problems, such as the sex of the experimenter and routine testing for gender differences in experimental data (see Hare-Mustin and Marecek 1990; Lykes and Steward 1986).

It is the appearance of the disruptions that would be brought on by reflexive activities, and the resistances to such disruptions, however, that deserve further exploration. If reflexivity is an inescapable condition of human action, including human science, then it must be operative in the very constitution of an unreflexive psychology — in the very strategies to avoid, manage, or deny it. If psychologists dismiss the self-referential properties of their theories, if they deny that their self-regard is of significance to their science, and if they assume the independence of representation and the represented object, then it is important to understand in what way these dismissals are themselves reflexive acts. It is likewise important that we begin to identify those reflexive strategies which have been used to control or smooth over reflexivity and make them part of our historical studies of the science.

Understanding reflexivity in psychology requires not simply uncovering that which has been invisible but also investigating the means by which psychologists have gone about making less visible or invisible those reflexive conditions of psychological inquiry that were visible to them. The dominant practice of thoroughly denying the reflexive properties of psychological research indicates, perhaps ironically, the success of protracted exercises of self-regard. In other words, the current invisibility of
reflexivity in psychology is an accomplishment of psychologists’ awareness, in whatever form or degree, of their own presence in the scientific process and the ultimate effects of their presence on scientific knowledge. This is an accomplishment of “self-awareness”, the self refers to psychologists’ cognitive processes, interpersonal styles, and cultural systems as well as their physical presence. The critical commentaries of the 1920s and 1930s described earlier in this article are illustrative of an anxious self-regard that ultimately contributed to a narrative purged of nearly any regard of self or presence: by “talking out” the weaknesses of the psychologist’s self, his or her psychological capacity to produce knowledge about reality, these psychologists “talked up” the champion in the form of objective methods. Behaving more like natural scientists, psychologists took reflexivity to be one of what Steve Woolgar calls the “methodological horrors” of science that must be covered over. In those decades, psychologists’ critical self-regard of the social bases of their knowledge (Oehler and Mullins 1986), coupled as it was with the difficulties accompanying any experiments in self-referential theorizing, was mobilized not to incorporate reflexive conditions but to erase them.

If psychologists have operated more like natural scientists than social scientists, and if they have (reflexively) devised means for dissolving or disguising reflexive practices, then examination of reflexivity in psychology must proceed by looking again at the adopted roles and discursive practices of psychologists. Instead of recording the ways in which psychology has been an unreflexive science, we must explore the means, often reflexive in nature, by which psychologists gradually but self-consciously denied, erased, displaced, or forgot the reflexive properties of their work. In these historical explorations we can begin to see how psychologists conquered reflexive problems by establishing specific social relations that typically, although not always, empowered psychological knowledge. We can also begin to understand the mutable but crucial relations between the development of the discipline as a set of scientific practices and the development of the psychologist as a psychological knower, a particular self. However, the identification of reflexivity and psychologists’ awareness of it raises several historiographical problems.

The Methodological Horrors of Methodological Horrors

The attempt to examine a social practice that functions to disguise or dissolve certain features of that practice produces an intriguing if complicated methodological task. First it is necessary to identify adequate evidence of these practices. The obvious sources to be examined include the prescriptions for producing knowledge and communications of that knowledge. Generally these exist in written form. But these resources signal a second and more perplexing methodological concern: how accurate are scientists’ verbal accounts of their practices, especially when those practices are then interpreted as deceptive, perhaps even self-deceptive?

Psychologists’ self-awareness, and their reconciliation of that awareness with what they have taken to be strict mandates of scientific practice, materialized in their speech as well as in their other actions. It seems an impossible task to differentiate the language of the new scientific psychology from the novel activities of building laboratories; in fact, these activities could not exist outside of discourse (for discussions of this issue see Shapin 1984a, 1984b; Tibbetts and Johnson 1985; Woolgar 1986). Furthermore, because psychologists’ new work concerned mapping the reality of human functioning and social interaction, their linguistic practices were especially important in distinguishing the reality they wanted to know from the commonly known reality of human functioning and interaction. Psychologists had to speak and write about themselves and others in a shared language that at once signified a new social practice and differed from secular language. Their accountings of new practices and forgings of differences afford us historical access to reflexive practices (Shapin 1984a).

Psychologists, then, had to both position and represent themselves in a manner that would eclipse or escape the “horror” of reflexivity confronted by natural scientists. Yet they had to do further work with reflexivity to differentiate their human activities from ordinary social interactions; that is, as they labored to become more “scientific” (to generate universal, objective knowledge about a lawful reality) and moved toward making specific and unique (scientific) claims about ordinary mental processes, experimental psychologists encountered greater challenges regarding reflexivity. At the end of the nineteenth century, American psychologists confronted this scientific mission by altering their practices and their talk about these practices — by restructuring their own identities and those of others. The following examples explore cases of the reconstructed selves and the smoothing of reflexivity required to present those selves; they show an intricate dance of self-regard and other-regard. Despite these and other complex work strategies, reflexivity and its threats were never dispelled entirely, and the final example in this paper notes several instances of a return, sometimes desired and sometimes not, of reflexivity.

The Maturing of Psychologists’ Selves

To nearly all scientific psychologists, their identity qua scientific psychologists is transparent. They at once assume a culturally marked identity as “scientists” as well as a more specific form of that identity, one derived from their discipline of training, psychology. This identity is achieved through the acquisition of professional credentials and is also domain-specific, dependent to some degree on engagement in particular professional activities such as teaching, research, or consulting. Fitted with professionalization and institutional structures, the psychologist’s identity generally wears well. It constitutes a rather unremarkable self.

Recent historical research has revealed layers of the psychologist’s garments. Richard Gillepsie’s (1988) reconstruction of the classic Hawthorne studies indicates that the psychologist’s identity, at least in those experiments, was enmeshed with those of the

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plant managers and corporate officials who assisted this experiment in the natural setting of a factory. Elizabeth Scarborough and Laurel Furomoto (1987) found that the first generation of female scientific psychologists led “untold lives” where their personal experiences and identities as women influenced their struggle to claim professional identities. Kurt Danziger (1988, 1990) examined published experimental reports to locate the social roles associated with the early psychologist’s identity. He discovered that experimental psychologists engaged in a variety of roles within the laboratory, sometimes even switching roles of subject and experimenter; by the early decades of this century, however, those roles had become restricted and the psychologist’s identity more narrowly defined in terms of a passive, distanced observer-agent.

These and other historical studies illuminate the complex historical origins of the psychologist’s identity (see Scheibe 1979), especially as it was manifested in the varied social practices constituting psychological work. Studies focusing on laboratory practices have indicated some pragmatic or instrumental reasons why psychologists chose a restricted role: for instance, the observation of sophisticated laboratories necessitated a clear and hierarchical division of labor. In addition, experimental studies of human mental processes required a distinction between the mental processes of the experimenter and those of the subjects of experimentation. Given the importance of maintaining a particular identity qua scientist, and in contrast to other beings involved in experimental work, it is of no surprise that psychologists periodically reflected on this identity in their writing. These reflections served to position psychologists in a highly specified relation to others, whether those others were subjects or readers. In turn, these reflections engendered a complex identity that contained inconsistent and troubling features. Even in their most mundane and routinized textual practices, psychologists encoded ambiguities of self-identity.

Through historical analyses we can ascertain how these ambiguities signal conflicts and anxieties that, although smoothed in discourse, nevertheless reveal fractures in the psychologist’s self. The emergence of these identity ambiguities is evident in several classic accounts written between the late nineteenth century and the end of World War II. Analyses of selected accounts reveal some of the strategies psychologists employed in attempting to maintain a stable and unitary self, to make unity out of disunity, and so to cover over the reflexive nature of psychological practice.

Appeasing Fallacies

Those who are familiar with the history of psychology might find it unfair to begin this analysis with the writings of William James: after all, James gradually grew uncertain of his career as a psychologist and ultimately left the field for philosophy. However, James was a forceful writer on behalf of scientific psychology and the scientific psychologist, and the work on which I will comment represents one of his most deliberate scientific statements. Like other introductory textbooks of that generation,

The Principles of Psychology (1890) had to convince readers that this brand new science was genuine, and that it furnished accounts of mental processes superior to ordinary understandings of those processes. James appears composed in his task of persuasion, holding forth with enough conviction to be able to write candidly about some possible weaknesses in the psychologist’s point of view.

James’ chapter on the methods and “snare” of psychology, contained in volume 1, displays this composure. After cleverly weighing the pros and cons of various methods (introspection, experimentation, comparative method), he introduces the reader to “the psychologist’s fallacy” — the “great snare of the psychologist . . . the confusion of his own standpoint with that of the mental fact about which he is making his report” (italics in the original). According to James, the psychologist “stands outside the mental state he speaks of”; both that state “and its objects are objects for him.” He (the psychologist) thus is easily led to suppose that the thought of an object knows the object “in the very same way he (the psychologist) knows it, although this is often far from the case” (James [1890] 1950, 196). A variety of this fallacy “is the assumption that the mental state studied must be conscious of itself as the psychologist is conscious of it” (ibid., 197).

Over the last hundred years James’ account has often been taken as the simple caveat “watch your inferences about the workings of another’s black box” or, in the case of infrahuman studies, “beware of anthropomorphism.” In actuality the revealed fallacy is more about differences than method — both the distinction between psychologists and ordinary perceivers (the subjects), and the difference between psychologists and their other selves. Most of the two pages of text devoted to the psychologist’s fallacy works to establish and maintain these differences. The first difference to be discerned in the passage is that between the psychologist and common perceivers. In fact, the fallacy is premised on this difference: the psychologist “stands outside of the mental state he speaks of” (ibid., 196) and the subject cannot. He continues: “What the thought sees is only its own object; what the psychologist sees is the thought’s object, plus the thought itself, possibly all of the rest of the world”; and, “The mental state is aware of itself only from within; it grasps what we call its mental content, and nothing more” (ibid., 197). James validates this opposition by using a rhetorical device that Bruno Latour (1987, 48) has called stratification, or layering, of material: stratified texts pack levels of argument and support thus making it more difficult for the reader to question or challenge its claims. Through this device the reader is reminded of a claim that James made earlier in the text. In that claim James divided the psychological world into four boxes (see fig. 1). With graphic illustration of this boxed world, James

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Figure 1. Source: James [1890] 1950, 183.
utilized another discursive device: While stratification leaves the reader, in Latour's words, "as free as a rat in a maze," the graphics suggest that "this is not a question any more of belief, this is seeing" (ibid.).

The momentary focus on rhetorical devices helps us understand better just how James persuaded readers of a significant difference that may have been potentially unpalatable to them. However, the main point is that this passage elaborates that difference and thus introduces a social (social-epistemological) hierarchy of knowers—a distribution of cognitive authority among unequals. The difference between psychologist and subject overshadows the other difference. James' fallacy refers to: the difference between the psychologist and his (her) lesser self. Although shown to inhabit a special box, in reality the psychologist "gets easily led to suppose" that ordinary thinkers know their thoughts "in the same way in which he knows it" (James [1890] 1950, 196). This is a "snare into which no psychologist has kept himself at all times from falling... We cannot be too watchful against its subtly corrupting influence" (ibid., 197). Thus the psychologist is ever susceptible to egalitarianism (assuming the subject has equal mental processes) or to ventriloquism (giving the psychologists' voice to the subject). Here the critical and superior eye of the psychologist is turned inward—and downward—toward the self that stands outside the special "Psychologist" box. As will become apparent, this excommunicated psychologist's self, although a minor figure in the account of the psychologist's fallacy, will not go away despite James' appeals for constant vigilance. It will also become clear that these selves, in their varied relational forms, are constructed in the texts although they function to represent a "real" self lying behind or beneath that text.

James' textbook is not unique in making this distribution of cognitive labor. Other books of the period take the "psychologist's standpoint" (Angell 1904, 8), whereby the knower is distanced from all natural phenomena, including the processes of his or her mind. Not only does this construction subordinate certain minds or consciousnesses, those of subjects to those of scientific psychologists; it also enables the (secondary) self of the knower to be managed or at least to be manageable, inasmuch as it, too, is accessible as a "natural object." Through these translations of consciousness, self-mastery was made possible and reflectivity rendered irrelevant, and the psychologist (potentially) could give scientific consideration to his or her other self.

Psychologists' Self at an Awkward Age

By the 1920s, American psychology was well on the way to abandoning introspective techniques and moving rapidly toward a behaviorist platform (O'Donnell 1985). Psychology simultaneously incorporated applied science and hence shifted toward studies using large samples of naive subjects who represented populations that would be regulated through applied psychology (Danziger 1990). At present we have little historical understanding of the consequences of these methodological shifts; however, even a cursory review of the journal literature of that period yields an interesting orientation toward subjects and psychologists alike. The oppositional distancing between subject and psychologist that operated in James' writing on fallacies had changed somewhat: by the second decade of the century, noticeable apprehension had been introduced into that hierarchical relationship. That apprehension took form in experiments designed to uncover the subjects' undesirable attributes as well as in commentaries on the subjects. For instance, a 1925 study compared the performance of a group of "sophisticated subjects" with a group of "naive subjects." Sophisticated subjects not only were given thorough information on the experimental methods but also were instructed about deception—the ways in which a guilty person might appear innocent (Strumberg 1925, 88). The results clearly indicated that experimenters could not readily detect "crimes" committed by sophisticated subjects. The author's apprehension grew when he acknowledged the implications of the study, and he concluded only with a question: "Could sophisticated subjects not only prevent detection of the crime, but also prevent detection of their sophistication?" (ibid., 95).

Other studies exhibit similar fears regarding the subject's powers or abilities to respond to experimental factors not labeled as variables by the researcher (see, for instance, Dulsky 1932; Rice 1929).

In a 1929 Psychological Review article, J. F. Dashiel wrote a "note on the Use of the Term 'Observer';" which ostensibly concerned a matter of terminology but actually told more about the apprehensive relation between the psychologist's self and other selves (the subjects or "observers"). Dashiel simply recommended that the subject not be called an "observer," a designation then commonly interchanged with that of "subject." His argument was straightforward: experiments most often record the observations not of the subject but of the experimenter. "In other words," he wrote, "in many contemporary lines of psychological investigation the so-called 'observer' does no observing!" Many experimental phenomena "are a matter of observation less to him (the subject) and more to the experimenter" (Dashiel 1929, 550). Dashiel made a strong claim for cognitive authority by asserting the differences between subject and experimenter as well as the superior attributes of the latter. In fact, he argued that in studying such phenomena as reactions, reaction tendencies, and efficiency, the relevant observations are not ones that concern the subject's direct experience at all. However, in claiming such privilege of vision, Dashiel placed himself in a bind, because for many of these phenomena the experimenter in fact had no better direct experience and possibly no direct experience at all; his one experimental example paradoxically illustrated his dilemma. Citing a study of eye-hand pursuit coordination, Dashiel noted that the data were derived from the quantitative recordings made by the experimenter and qualitative reports by spectators, and added that the "subject himself was not called upon for report" (ibid., 551). The conundrum is evident: although the subject obviously had to observe in an eye-hand coordination task, his observation was discounted; the experimenter observed the recordings and not the actual phenomena, while the spectators observed only the subjects' "signs of confusion, uneasiness, etc." (ibid.)

Aside from the confusions regarding who is and who is not observing, or perhaps
because of them, Dashiel’s commentary contains tactics for differentiating the psychologist from the subject. Dashiel marshaled the “literature” to support his argument; but in doing so he unsteadied the hierarchy of observers he had created. In scientific writing reference to the literature discriminates among readers (Latour 1987), placing some in a more privileged position than others, and the author in the most privileged position of all (see Bazerman 1988; Morawski and Steele 1991; Shapin 1984a). Dashiel utilized this means of discrimination by both writing that “one example from the literature” of which he seems to have full control “still suffices” (Dashiel 1929, 551). This marshaling of the scientific legion was augmented in the article’s final sentence, where he lists (and thus enlists) eminent psychologists who use the term “subject.” However, in gathering the experimental evidence from the literature Dashiel did no observing, as he defined it, at all. Dashiel thus explicitly supported his claims at least as strongly by rhetorical devices as by observed “evidence.”

Dashiel’s elaboration and defense of the psychologist’s self, especially the psychologist’s cognitive competency, is cloaked by a discussion of the subject in which the latter’s attributes are invoked to give substance to the psychologist’s attributes. This strategy is common in writings on difference: the “other” — in this case the experimental subject — becomes the site upon which the self of the primary subject — the psychologist — is articulated.

Another place in which we can find accounts of the psychologist’s self during the 1920s and 1930s is in the controversies over appropriate theory. The early twentieth-century shift toward behavioral models was not smooth but rather involved extended debates between competing theoretical schools and methodological viewpoints. In writing about these controversies, psychologists often examined not only the theoretical issues at stake but also the psychologists themselves. Occasionally, although rarely, these documents were personalized; for the most part the slippage from discussions of theory to those of the psychologist occurred at the level of generalities, especially generalities about what we can now recognize as the psychologist’s lesser self. In “The Schools of Psychology” (1931), Stevenson Smith claimed that schools had their origin not in the laboratory but in the “garden” (p. 461) and admonished psychologists to separate their science and their metaphysics, and to rid themselves of “cultism” (p. 463) and self-acclamation (p. 473). R. H. Wheeler (1925) compared the accuracy of an “introspectively-minded psychologist” to that of a woodsmen, tea taster, and deaf mute; he then suggested: “Rarely can an expert in the workaday world tell us how he makes his discriminations” (p. 446). E. G. Boring (1929) adopted a different guise in writing about the controversies; his article — entitled “The Psychology of Controversy” (1929) — confronts directly the psychological dynamics — emotional and irrational — he found under the ongoing debates. Boring was not sanguine that a solution to these dynamics could be found because “the scientific eye sees dimly when it turns through half a circle to look behind itself” (ibid., 98). In the end, Boring advocated that psychologists “cultivate dissociation,” asserting: “Too much has been said in favor of the integration of the personality, and too little in favor of dissociation. The scientist needs to be a dual personality” (ibid., 120). Yet he hoped that these two personalities, the “prosecutor” and the “judge” (the reflexive half) would not be completely dissociated.

In his classic article on conflicting psychology, Clark Hull (1935) also made psychologists the primary subject, but accounts of this subject were submerged within a discourse on scientific method. For this reason, Hull’s article is more typical of psychologists’ written accounts of their selves: as psychological writing matured, the psychologist’s self receded in the text by being more closely identified with the method itself. I have suggested elsewhere that in the case of Hull this identification served a progressive kind of “cognitive paranoia,” where a prime subjectivity (the experimenter) could more completely rid itself of a secondary subjectivity (cognitive weaknesses), mainly by projecting those weaknesses on to others (Morawski 1988b).

Hull’s 1935 paper opens with what was becoming a common criticism of psychologists’ pervasive emotionalism and metaphysical wanderings. This lamentable condition, as he saw it, resulted at once from psychologists’ immaturity ("we have not yet cast off the unfortunate influences of our early associations with metaphysicians") and sin ("somehow we have permitted ourselves to fall into essentially unscientific practices") (p. 492). Despite the discordant imagery of youth and sinners (all, by the way, contained in a single paragraph), Hull proposed a singular corrective for the psychologist’s condition. The remainder of the article makes few references to the psychologist; instead it outlines the scientific procedures necessary for excluding the psychologist’s tester or secondary self: these procedures entail a system of logic and mathematics, of hypotheses and deductions, of postulates and experimental verification. Hull’s solution also depends on economic metaphor, complete with a “standard” and currency of logic (Hull 1935, 510). Throughout the article, Hull described his scientific procedures as a system of exchange where “a complete laissez-faire policy should obtain in regard to postulates” (p. 511) and where even the rational investor takes chances (p. 500). Here as elsewhere Hull referred to scientific work as “labor” (pp. 495, 497), but his article elides any conception of the worker; in fact, Hull so thoroughly identified the psychologist with the work that the psychologist disappears into the logical machinery of complex scientific procedure.

In other writings, and especially in his laboratory notebooks, Hull generated more explicit critical analyses of the cognitive weaknesses of most psychologists and ordinary beings (Morawski 1986). In “Conflicting Psychologies” this condemnation is more subtle but nevertheless present. Psychologically handicapped workers bear the shortcomings of the psychologist’s self, while the psychologist’s self, which is able to identify completely with a mechanistic system, is saved.

Hull’s writing illustrates the refinement of the dissociation of the psychologist’s selves and the identification of the psychologist’s primary self with method. Through these moves, made gradually during mid-century, facets of the psychologist’s self become invisible. Their reappearance is rare, limited to psychologists’ most damning critiques of competitors, a discursive strategy used by natural scientists (Mulkay and Gilbert 1982). While the writings of Boring and Hull indict all psychologists, perhaps excepting themselves, contemporary indictments are specific to the “other” selves
which, if detected, might undermine the psychologist-author's privileged account of mental life. Judging by their numbers alone, introductory texts were a resource that many middle-class Americans had available to them and actually used, notably, in formal courses. In constructing these texts authors had to balance their account of readers' selves with the implicit self-concepts held by those readers at that cultural moment. Psychologist-authors managed this equilibrium of subjectivities by representing the reader as a particular other in relation to the psychologist.

My investigation of introductory textbooks, currently in progress, has detected a historical shift, a period when the various selves represented in the texts were transformed. In this shift the author's self receded and eventually became identified with scientific method, and the reader's self became at once distinctly marked and malleable. This transformation needs to be seen in the broader context of American culture, and that cultural matrix informs an analysis of the selves that populated the texts.

A New Audience

The readers to whom introductory textbooks were marketed were the students who, in growing numbers, were entering American colleges and universities in search of both opportunity and entertainment. In 1870, 52,000 students were enrolled in 563 institutions of higher education; by 1900 enrollment had increased over fourfold, to 238,000 in 977 institutions. (Although most college "men" were white and male, by 1900 40 percent of the undergraduate population was female.) The faculty also increased during that period — nearly fourfold, from 5,553 in 1870 to 23,868 in 1900. It is more difficult to determine the number and demographics of undergraduates who specifically studied psychology. Until the wide-scale adoption of the elective system in the 1890s, students generally took courses in moral philosophy, which included a term of coursework in psychology/mental science. By 1904 at least 62 institutions had three or more psychology courses, and 8 large universities required a psychology course for the B.A. (for a discussion of these innovations see Bledstein 1976; Camfield 1969, Fay 1939; Veysey 1965). Judging by the increased number of textbooks, professors of psychology, and psychology courses, the number of students who studied psychology during their undergraduate years was substantial.

The students entering higher education in the last three decades of the nineteenth century lived in a buzz of social and economic activity: rapid industrialization, technological innovations (especially in transportation and communication), and urbanization. Economic conditions were unsteady, with several depressions and recoveries, while business organizations were transformed into hierarchical and inclusive corporate structures. Combined with large-scale immigration, the maturation of mass education, and the continued demise of religious influence, these social changes implied new relations between workers and production, producers and consumers, ethnic groups and social classes, as well as within families and among
co-workers. What is most noticeable about these social relations is that they entailed multiple shifts of existing relations; an increase in, even a proliferation of, relations; and a distancing or obscuring of the relations in which the individual acted (see Bledstein 1976; Ohmann 1987).

Given these demographic trends, the audience for the "new" psychology textbooks were largely white, American-born, middle-class youths who were about to enter an adult world of new social arrangements and who saw higher education as an opportunity to improve their standing. Education came to be equated with professionalization — the standardization of middle-class work; and Burton Bledstein (1976) found that professionalism was not simply a legitimation of certain skills and organization of work, but a culture that engendered the mentalities of its producers and consumers alike. In this culture "middle-class individuals sharpened their emotional needs and measured their powers of intelligence" (p. x) and education afforded a "formal context for the competitive spirit of individual egos" (p. 31).

These middle-class students lived in a field of tensions, giving rise to notable anxieties. One set of tensions emerged when the possibilities for vertical mobility coincided with the formation, in all institutions, of corporate hierarchies of broad pyramids where only a few reached the peak. Another valence of tension derived from the coexistence of emphasis on ambition, dedication, self-control, and hard work on the one hand and sanctions for leisure, sport, and permissive consumption of new mass-marketed products on the other. In colleges, study was not supposed to interfere with good times; collective entertainment — whether football or fraternities — occupied a significant portion of students' time. Popular literature effused frolic and adventure, and magazines offered the reader ideas about new products and services, not to mention new identities (Fox and Lears 1987; Ohmann 1988). The middle-class culture of professionalism privileged first-hand experience of reality in work and in play. However, experience and reality were both becoming increasingly difficult to locate, and this confusion constituted a third tension. The anticipated possibilities that could be accrued through experience were often in conflict with a growing sense of the complexity, multiplicity, and obscurity of experience. The emerging trust in the veracity of scientific knowledge — a faith axiomatic to professionalism — promised ultimate access to reality. Yet at the same time this proliferation of new expert knowledges, especially the social sciences, suggested that there were multiple realities: just as sociology produced knowledge about sociological reality, so did economics develop its own configuration of reality, as did psychology, and so on. Fields as distinct as physics and psychiatry were suggesting that reality is not at all like ordinary beings imagine it to be. As Richard Hofstadter reported, 1890s progressives saw psychic events as "a kind of pale reflex" of a reality hidden from ordinary perception (quoted in Haskell 1977).

Middle-class culture of the late nineteenth century, especially for youth, harbored anxieties as well as ambition, self-doubt as well as self-control and knowledge, and fragmentation as well as order. If the 1890s are seen only in terms of the professionalization of the sciences, vertical mobility, and progressive attitudes, then we can see how the new psychology served the citizens of this culture by offering a utilitarian, reformist, and scientifically grounded profession. If, however, we acknowledge the ongoing transformation of individual identities and social relations, along with the instability produced by those transformations, then psychology also was instrumental in the very process of "defining identities appropriate to a changed reality" (Rosenberg 1979, 443).

New Texts, Authors, and Readers

Although textbooks are among the more widely available narratives of psychology, they have been the object of few historical studies. To date I have located approximately seventy-five first-edition books published between 1870 and 1910; the large number of texts published after that date poses a bibliographic nightmare. Between 1889 and 1890 introductory textbooks underwent several substantial alterations: while the topical coverage, even chapter headings, look similar, the authors and readers do not. Prior to 1887 authors described themselves as caretakers, transmitters, and conservative reformers of a body of knowledge that had been parented through generations, typically from the Greeks onward. At the same time they recurrently indicated their personal standpoint and often supported claims with examples from their "experience": a notion of self as author and as a set of experiences thus buttressed these genealogies of truth. As Hamilton noted in his 1883 textbook, he wrote foremost for himself and then to furnish "a scientific book such as every gentleman should have for reading and for reference" (p. iii). The audiences imaged in these earlier texts were likewise interested in self-betterment, and although their social and economic status is not stated, their position can be inferred: privileged, gentle, and receptive to guidance.

By contrast, the authors portrayed in the later textbooks are minimally present, or they appear not as unique scholars but as a conglomeration of professional competencies. Just as the personal and sometimes even intellectual identity of the author recedes in the new textbooks, so the identity and psychology of the reader become more precisely marked. Readers are teachers or teachers in training, high school or normal school students, potential lawyers, businessmen, or "ordinary" people. They are men of action, interested in laboring to examine real life more fully and to master its complexity. To E. A. Kirkpatrick (1894), the readers of his text have no interest in the "thoroughly dried specimens" of the older mental science or in laws that the student cannot observe and verify. "Real knowledge and power" require that the pupil "observe and analyze the actual processes of his own mind and those of others instead of taking what the author tells him about imaginary mental processes" (Kirkpatrick 1894, 3–4).

The readers' ambitions, whether to pursue a career in psychology or elsewhere, are aligned with the edict that "a man's reach should exceed his grasp" (Buell 1898, iv).

Readers of the later textbooks are beckoned to take the psychologist's standpoint — that is, to acquire the ability to know with certainty the "real" of life experiences. Sometimes this standpoint is offered as an immediate possibility, in the form of
experiments the reader can perform on his or her own. More often the standpoint is posed as the very motive for reading, and the reader's ability to see with the psychologist's clear vision is simply pages away: "With a clean, well-trained eye and the mind's 'rational field' cleared of all floating specks, the student of psychology must ever seek the truth, and the truth alone, if he would not be handicapped" (Krohn 1894, 20). From the psychologist's standpoint, "face-to-face experience of actual life is essential" (Ladd 1894, 21). Readers are given the possibility not simply of gaining new psychological experiences but of understanding the "real nature" of those experiences. "It is not arrogant to claim that the trained psychologist understands not only the child, the idiot, the madman, and the hypnotic subject, but also the artist, the scientist, the statesman, and the thinker, as psychological being, far better than any of these classes understand each other, or even themselves" (ibid.). Not only are the mental faculties of scientific psychologists posed as the most veridical means of knowing reality, but these faculties are presented as being desired and attainable by the reader. The readers of post-1887 texts are assumed to be seeking not so much self-improvement as mastery over others: they want to become the organizers of experience and the detecting eyes, the managers and the surveyors. Yet, as we shall see, beyond this image of readers as ambitious, independent, and aspiring to certain skills are textual messages that insist on their passivity.

Arranging Social Relations

The new authors and readers prepared the way for new understandings of psychological phenomena. These new actors both reflected and helped fashion particular rationalities and subjectivities. As such they were productive of certain experiences and social roles, which in turn demanded the containment or denial of other role possibilities. Students were invited simultaneously to be consumers and potential producers of the new psychology; they were offered positions that promised action, experience of self, and a veridical grasp on reality. What these new roles enabled, in fact, was a changed world, one that specified new relations within and between perceiving individuals, and between individuals and what came to be taken as reality.

The new textual relations of selves constitute strategies of power, in that they stipulate who can perceive, correctly identify causation, and control, and how to do so (Foucault 1980; Latour 1987; Rose 1990). In the textbooks, readers' selves are constructed as lacking but nevertheless desiring those attributes portrayed in the increasingly self-less self of the psychologist. These marked selves set the stage for further discursive work in the texts whereby certain ways of perceiving the world (in fact, certain worlds) are privileged over others. For instance, my preliminary analysis of textbook illustrations indicates that their successful use both depends on, and reinforces these positioned selves in order to point to "true" reality. The precariously positioned selves of readers, then, both make possible a more complete textual

displacement of the psychologist's personal self and help establish a correct gaze on the world, one that requires a scientific self.

One methodological ingredient that is essential to the earlier textbooks and disappears in nearly all the later texts is an observer's self defined in terms of "self-consciousness." To J. Clark Murray, writing in 1885, mind is equivalent to self, as well as to "the I," "the me," and "the ego"; and the "knowledge of what is passing within me is called consciousness." This knowledge, or consciousness, determines the appropriate method of psychology, and it is only through "this accompanying consciousness, directed by proper precautions, that we must investigate the mind" (Murray 1885, 4–5). A textbook published the next year similarly argues: "In psychology we make our observations by self-consciousness, which is the power by which we take cognizance of self as acting; say as thinking or feeling, as remembering the past or anticipating the future, as loving, fearing, resolving" (McCosh 1886, 1–2). In yet another text it is claimed: "The facts of the objective sciences are discovered through the senses. The facts of psychology are chiefly revealed only in consciousness. Instead of looking without to find them, we look within" (Bowen 1886, 2). The methods of psychology, then, always rest on a complex fact; for mental experience requires a subject to experience, and "hence we may say that the simplest mental fact is at least double, involving a mental state and a subject of which it is a state" (ibid., 11). As described in these texts, the observer's self is constituted of the same stuff as is the subject's (reader's) self.

The later textbooks give little or no attention to the role of self-consciousness in psychological methods. An 1894 text likened reflection on self-consciousness to a merchant taking inventory of the "goods in his store" or like the greyhound "trying to outrun his shadow" (Krohn 1894, 24). Given the "deranging effects of close scrutinizing attention" (p. 25), self-conscious experience fails. The solution rests with "rigorous," "systematic," and "painstaking" research (p. 34). In an 1898 text, the psychologist who employed self-consciousness is taken to be someone who "needed only an occasional glimpse into the outside world. He could shut himself in his study, and, being himself both observer and observed, could spin his theories . . . undisturbed by the fact that busy minds in the outside world might not agree at all" (Buell 1898, 2). These older methods are further criticized for their unavailability to "common people," who lack the spare time to engage in this introspective activity. The psychologist of "the new school" casts off this self-consciousness in favor of new techniques:

His study is a workshop and laboratory combined, wherein may be found numerous delicate and costly instruments for testing and measuring the intricate processes of minds, both those of human beings and those of lower animals. His results are expressed in the language of the common people. He is all the time in search of new material, and any person who visits his workshop is liable to be made the victim of some kind of experiment. (Buell 1898, 2)

The later textbooks thus denounce certain cognitive experiences (self-consciousness
being one) while recognizing other experiences. It was these newer experiences that
came to be embodied in roles of authority.
If the knower/observer is placed in a more distant relation to self, or consciousness
as it was conventionally defined, then he (or she) also is made different from the
nonpsychologist, including the reader whose self or consciousness is the object of
scientific study. However, at the same time, the reader's self is vested with the potential
to become like that of the psychologist. With this hierarchy of selves (knowers and
would-be knowers), it is simply a matter of deploying textual tactics to claim a superior
if not sole access to reality. In psychology this reality was portrayed at once as
subjective yet natural, and as obscured to most observers. On the surface, these claims
about reality appear audacious and possibly contentious: they ask that ordinary
readers accept the apparent contradiction that mental reality is both subjective and
natural and, in addition, that they relinquish their own purchase on mental life.
Through the elaborate construction of selves in particular relations with one another,
the way was prepared for psychologists to claim authority to define this reality.
Readers were invited to see this reality only if they were good (passive) readers who
would eventually identify their selves with what we can now recognize as the
psychologist's non-self-conscious self. That reality was rendered visible, first through
illustrations and second through a series of textual transformations where subjective
psychological states were declared natural and yet made resistant or not readily
accessible. Through these transformations, material reality gave way to an "objective"
psychological reality and readers were persuaded to disregard all other realities,
including their own experiences.
If the new psychology textbooks met the desires of late nineteenth-century readers
(their aspirations, anxieties, and urge to experience the real), then they did so by
furnishing a mental environment in which these desires could be smoothed or
transformed. Psychology textbooks, among other modern practices, mobilized
acceptance of a mental reality which was the product of particular selves in search of a
selfhood that, in turn, was compatible with certain social and economic conditions.
Textbooks proposed a reality of ambition, promising social mobility via access to the
experience of a scientific self. Readers, it appears, were invited to engage in reflexive
fantasy by associating their desired state of being with that of a trained psychologist.
However seductive, this reflexive role was a limited one.

The Return of Reflexivity

The analyses of psychological writings presented above by no means provide a
comprehensive or deep history of reflexivity in psychology or even of psychologists'
and others' selves. Rather, they give historical snapshots of psychologists' discursive
handling of reflexivity. The search for a unitary and reflexive self, which prompted
various intellectual sojourns in the nineteenth century (see Baumeister 1987), was not
quite appropriate for modern psychologists whose very enterprise depended on
recognizing discrepancies between selves, specifically between the experimenter/
psychologist's self and that of the common perceive. The strategic moves to
substantiate differences — both differences between psychologists and others and
differences between the psychologist's primary and secondary selves — were necessary
to the technical staging of experimentation. These two forms of differences were
interdependent: both contributed to a social epistemology that smoothed over
reflexivity problems and enabled the relatively efficient production of psychologists'
work.

However, as Boring suspected, the dissociation between the psychologist's selves,
and hence between psychologists and others, has never been fully realized. Reflexivity
has not been eliminated entirely. The passages analyzed above illustrate the anxiety
and even fear that can accompany any consideration of the dissociated others. Why do
the specters of these others return? Or, put another way, why do psychologists persist
in slipping from their unreflexive selves?
Perhaps this doubling, along with the haunting presence of dissociated and
differentiated others, is actually an unappreciated route to social power. These multiple
selves, then, might be considered as vehicles in what Michel Foucault has identified as
a "productive network" of power where what typically is taken to be repression or
social restraint actually operates as a productive force in shaping certain social orders
of power. Foucault argued that power is not a negative force but
traverses and produces things, it induces pleasure, forms knowledge, produces
discourse. It needs to be considered as a productive network which runs through
the whole social body, much more than as a negative instance whose function is
repression. (Foucault 1980: 119)

If this is the case, then we need to examine how psychologists' dual selves, along with
their dissociation, suppression, and periodic reintegration, might serve a productive
network of power even as they are talked about as negative or unwanted features of
scientific life. We also need to assess in more detail the kinds of "others" that are
construed by psychologists and how these differentiated others — laboratory subjects,
readers, the subjects produced in theories, etc. — might contribute to the very creation
of psychological knowledge.

Yet another way of exploring the multiple selves that have been reflexively designed
by psychologists is suggested in postmodern perspectives on selfhood. From this
vantage point, psychologists' selves might be seen as typical of the partiality and
fragmentation of contemporary selfhood in its encounters with the myriad contra-
dictions of social life. Perhaps the persistent slippage and consequent bifurcation of
selves exemplify the "empty self" identified by Philip Cushman (1990). Cushman has
suggested that the twentieth-century self is "a disappointment to itself" (p. 608) in that
the socially dominant expectations for autonomy and self-realization are discordant
with the culture’s failure to nourish this self. The result is a needy, empty self who seeks
fulfillment in a number of cultural commodities, including psychotherapy. In turn the
selves created as commodities for consumption, despite their variations in therapy,
advertising, or whatever, all share the attribute of incompleteness or deficiency, and thus further engender selves in need of fulfillment.

These newer theories of subjectivity and cultural arrangements need to be considered in future studies of reflexivity in psychology. In the meantime, it seems clear that psychologists’ two selves and their oppositional others were conceived and nurtured during a historical moment when the self was rendered problematic (see Baumeister 1987; Rose 1990; Sampson 1981). The profession of psychology seems to have benefited in some ways from the cultural predication of the self insofar as it has been given the job of generating and applying knowledge about the self (Cushman 1990). Yet the very bifurcation of the psychologist’s self and the ongoing conflicts and fears in the resultant two selves, along with the contradictions created by differentiating the psychology of the knower and other subjects, may be one cost of that cultural arrangement.

A review of reflexivity would be misleading without considering the moments when psychologists have departed from the usual strategies for managing reflexive activities. Psychologists sometimes candidly acknowledge the reflexive properties of psychological practice. Admitting reflexivity can at times actually augment psychologists’ attempts to persuade and control: it can be used either to subvert or to support an interpretation of reality. With the professionalization of psychological work, however, this bald use of reflexivity has become more difficult. As sociologists and historians have repeatedly demonstrated, scientific procedures, the organization of labor, and the rhetoric of science not only make possible consistent (if not consensual) knowledge but also protect the status and hegemony of that knowledge. Earlier in this century psychology was less organized and consolidated in these ways, and it was thus more vulnerable to the candid deployment of reflexivity. For instance, Grace Adams, a Titchener-trained experimentalist, turned to nonscientific writing as a means to criticize psychology. Using a popular literary form, the nonfiction magazine article, Adams used psychology’s criteria for generating lawful knowledge to demonstrate the insufficiencies of the knowledge psychologists had, in fact, produced. She then attempted to restore validity to commonsensical knowledge, arguing for its superiority over esoteric, laboratory-based information. Despite the success of this reflexive turning back on psychology, Adams walked into a paradox that reflexive practices can present: writing from the privileged vantage of an expert identity, she attempted to deconstruct that position (Morawski and Hornstein 1991).

Another example of the disruptive use of reflexivity involved the work of an outsider. In 1948, Ruth Herscherger published a book on women’s roles that contained a chapter ostensibly written by a chimpanzee. Josie, the chimp, was a subject in an experimental study by Robert Yerkes, a leading psychologist and primatologist of the period. In Herscherger’s book, Josie presented a stellar scientific critique of Yerkes’ methods and then offered an alternative explanation of what had transpired in the experiment. Yerkes’ study involved the systematic observation of male and female chimpanzees housed in the same cage and given carefully timed feedings. His results led him to conclude that male dominance was a universal component of social relations, and that his observations illustrated the ways this dominance was manifested in male-female social interaction. Herscherger’s use of a fictional literary form, a story told by a female chimpanzee, revealed some reflexive problems inherent in a science designed by male humans (Herscherger 1948). However, Herscherger’s exercise also illustrates the ineffectiveness of reflexive discourse, especially when used by outsiders, in a relatively developed science: Yerkes gave only minimal attention to the critique, and Herscherger’s chapter went largely unrecognized for over thirty years, until it was recovered by feminist scholars (Morawski 1988a).

A more common route for the calculated engagement of reflexivity is opened when the well-known distinctions between the identities of the psychologist and the subject are dismantled or at least seriously questioned. Here the psychologist is candidly reflexive, pointing either to the problems of representation or to those of the self-referential quality of theory, or both. For instance, in 1977, Richard Nisbett and T. D. Wilson published a provocative challenge to a central tenet of cognitive psychology — that subjects have veridical access to their mental processes. Nisbett and Wilson then extended their doubts about subjects’ capabilities to experimenters: they claimed that in the experimental literature even experimenters failed to report accurately what happened in the laboratory. Later in the article the authors compounded this dilemma when they confessed that “in general, we were no more accurate in our predictions about stimulus effects than the subjects proved to be” (Nisbett and Wilson 1977, 242). Not only are subjects and other experimenters inadequate reporters, but the authors, too, apparently held no special powers in detecting causal connections.

Although Nisbett and Wilson’s study succeeded in shaking the stable theoretical position of cognitive psychologists, the reflexive strategy of their commentary has caused no notable reaction. The acceptance of their work suggests that routinized strategies for smoothing or dispelling the reflexive properties of psychological research are more resistant to attack than are particular theories or constructs. In fact, Nisbett and Wilson’s self-regarding confession ironically may have served to augment the validity and authenticity of their scientific document.

Conclusion

The cases reviewed here suggest that psychologists have approached reflexivity as either a condition to be eliminated or a resource for persuasion. Despite a history of calls for self-awareness, psychologists for the most part have adopted positions consistent with James’ depiction of the psychologist’s self. Psychologists acknowledge certain forms of self-regard — or, rather, they acknowledge certain features of their selves — and utilize methods that differentiate their selves from those of their subjects. Canonized (yet reflexive) procedures for scientific work reproduce the multiple selves of researchers and subjects — selves that inhibit any further recognition of reflexivity or its horrors. These defined and well-managed subjectivities, as seen in the case of textbook writing, carry particular cultural meanings, just as they afford a means to
avoid problems of reflexivity in experimentation and theorizing. Even the occasional discussions of reflexivity or actual reflexive practices have not disrupted these conventions.

Whether illustrative of the management of subjectivities, the postmodern predicament, or the "mobilization" of forces that constitute doing science, psychologists' self-regarding disregard for reflexivity is firmly entrenched in their work. This attitude of denial is so central to psychological practice that the cautious reintroduction of reflexivity can, in some instances, serve as an interpretive tool for persuasion without disturbing dominant conventions. However, psychologists' reflexive strategies need not and should not be taken as devious, for they are expedient social means toward the execution of psychological work.

Much more needs to be done to comprehend the complexities of reflexivity within psychology. Historians of psychology have a special opportunity to explore these features, since their subject is everywhere concerned with self-awareness, awareness of that awareness, and so on. Just as historians of psychology have been urged to reconsider what it is they are writing histories about (Smith 1988), so we must rethink how that historical work represents psychologists — their actions, interests, self-conceptions, denials, and limitations. We need to theorize about scientists just as we do about the science and its evolution, and likewise we need to develop historical methods appropriate to the task. Taking psychologists seriously in our historical investigations requires taking reflexivity seriously; it requires seeking in our historical studies the ways in which psychologists have handled reflexive conditions in their theories, laboratories, and discourse.

References


*Department of Psychology*  
*Wesleyan University*

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**KURT DANZIGER**

**The Project of an Experimental Social Psychology: Historical Perspectives**

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**The Argument**

The notion that experimentation provides an appropriate means for acquiring valid knowledge about some aspects of social reality has always depended on certain presuppositions about the nature of social reality and about the role of experiment in knowledge acquisition. In this paper I examine historical changes in these presuppositions from the beginnings of social psychological experimentation to the period after World War II.

It was late nineteenth-century crowd psychology that provided the theoretical inspiration for the first systematic steps in the application of experimental methods to the investigation of social psychological problems. The basic question addressed by these early experiments was derived from the individualistic social ontology of crowd psychology. It was this ontology that made the microcosm of the experimental situation appear relevant to social reality outside this situation.

In the 1940s experimental social psychology was briefly influenced by a nonindividualistic social ontology for which group phenomena were real. In the work of Kurt Lewin this was linked to an anti-individualist conception of experimentation derived from Gestalt psychology and the philosophy of Ernst Cassirer. However, this model proved to be utterly unassimilable by American social psychology which was dominated by an individualistic social ontology and an inductivist philosophy of experimentation that mutually supported each other.

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For most disciplines the union of content and methodology is consummated rather smoothly. Techniques may come and go, but overall methodological prescriptions tend to remain stable over relatively long periods of time. Physicists do experiments and historians do archival work without often questioning whether that is what physicists or historians should be doing.

Social psychology is different. Although there are many social psychologists for whom their discipline is an experimental science like any other, there is also a considerable literature that seriously questions the appropriateness of employing experimental methodology for investigating social psychological problems (e.g., Gergen 1978, 1982; Harré and Secord 1972). Certainly, social psychology is unique