The importance of history to social psychology

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When invited to contribute a chapter on the importance of history—on why social psychologists should consider their discipline’s history—I delighted at the opportunity to share some of the innovative, sometimes provocative histories that lay outside the purview of canonical histories familiar to social psychologists. Soon, however, the project encountered perplex, a sticking point: Readily available textbook histories of social psychology suffice in presenting an orderly narrative of the field’s evolution. Canonical (internal and textbook) histories recount a science that adopted a particular understanding of the social as quintessentially psychological phenomena along with methods that privileged experimentation and quantification. These insider chronicles highlight a social psychology that absorbed as well psychology’s presuppositions that phenomena are transtemporal and universal (holding for all humans across time). These narratives travel smoothly into the present, for contemporary social psychology still consorts with what became its master discipline, assimilating current trends toward cognitive, neuroscientific, and evolutionary psychology. In so much as official histories outline social psychology’s trajectory and scientific allegiance, why would social psychologists need or want more?

The perplex thickens when introducing the histories that I entreat fellow social psychologists to explore. These histories, broadly described as “contextual,” understand the discipline’s developments to be choices made: They were neither inevitable nor even empirically determined. More importantly, contextual histories scrutinize the consequences of disciplinary decisions along with options abandoned or overlooked. They trace social psychology’s theories and epistemological premises, examine its economic and political imperatives, and probe the cultural origins and meanings that made today’s social psychology possible. Why explore social psychology’s complicated, sometimes even messy, hidden, or vestigial heritage? This perplexed me notwithstanding training in experimental social psychology and a research program committed to the history of psychology. Yet in this rather idiosyncratic career lay a key to loosenning the perplex: the commitments to science shared by both social psychologists and recent historians of science.

Three commitments highlight what importance history can have for social psychology: evidence, methods, and theory. Contextual, evidence-based histories bring to the fore the actual practices, decisions, and even elisions of social psychology. In so doing they encounter theories that were abandoned and evidence laid aside, uncovering the ways that social psychology has both depended upon and contributed to material conditions of the social world—economics, technologies, institutions, public policy, and cultural beliefs. With attention to the evidence from the broader cultural and scientific context, they bring to the fore some of the intellectual developments in the human sciences, such as the revolution in linguistics and studies of reflexivity, that were largely eschewed by social psychology. These are facts about social psychology’s past from which the matter of methods follows. Mainstream histories, in outlining a trajectory that accords with contemporary self-understandings, use evidentiary bases akin to those of autobiography and, as such, they are susceptible to the evidentiary limitations of self-report found in autobiographical memory. The methods of contextual histories are hardly singular, yet they engage methodological standards more closely aligned with aims of empirical observation. Attending not only to esteemed experiments or research techniques, these studies also examine the financial incentives, political climates, personal influences, normative assumptions, and institutional relations with other social sciences. In other words, they investigate more closely— and broadly—the actual scientific practices that made social psychology mature as it has. Contextual inquiries, then, have empirically rich grounds, making possible more comprehensive accounts of the circuits that link the science to technologies, culture, politics, money, and individual actors.

As for the matter of theory there are two notable points of congruence between social psychology’s enterprise and histories of the science. One convergence concerns an investment in assessing contemporary theory. Whereas canonical histories strive to provide a linear chronicle of scientific progress that points to contemporary work, contextual studies recover the variations and fates of theories; among the findings of the latter approach is a once capacious and creative theorizing about the social psychological world that was directed and ultimately diminished through incorporation of core precepts from psychology proper (and more recently from that master discipline’s interest in neuroscience, biology, and economics). Contextual histories thereby better inform us about social psychology’s once indigenous theorizing that, in turn, enables fuller knowledge about possibilities for future as well as current theories. Contextual history’s attention to the creativity,
Ural the past three decades, histories of the social sciences were considered to be the history of a single, unified social psychology, psychology exemplified by historical narratives, were crafted mostly by practicing social scientists themselves. They presented (in portraying progressive paths to professionalization) research that starts as an apparent paradox can open the way for innovation.

In the end, fuller historical understanding is important for all social psychologists, whether they want greater security in their careers or wish to advance the status and prestige of their discipline. Models. Calling for fuller historical knowledge presumes no single theoretical or philosophical perspective. In this sense, appealing for greater awareness the field's history is analogous to calls for representative sampling of research participants. The authors of a recent review of psychology's biased sampling marshalling evidence indicating that psychology research needs better representation of the world population. While one might readily presume that demands for diversity in subject selection would be made by researchers committed to a "cultural" or "nurture" perspective, the authors are, in fact, inclined toward more biological perspectives. For them, related knowledge is paramount and it is necessary to place any knowledge of "universal features of psychology on a firmer footing by empirically addressing, rather than a priori dismissing or ignoring, questions of population variability" (Hennig, Heine, & Norenzayan, 2010, p. 3). Similar logic holds for histories that are incomplete or partial. By ignoring, for instance, the varied aspirations underlying racial dynamics, "the gay agenda"—a mandate that dramatically altered the course of North American social psychology—grounds for continuing that now hegemonic presupposition remain empirically (and philosophically) undetermined, and its entanglement in behaviorist, pessimist, and psychoanalytic assumptions goes unquestioned (Graumann, 1996; Greenwood, 2004; Parkvick, 2000). History thus can importantly inform science.

Histories of a science

During the past half-century, a transition generally marked by Thomas Kuhn's thesis on scientific revolutions transformed the historiography of science beyond formulac narratives of scientific progressional and institutional boundaries. Whether scientific change is better explained by "internal" laboratory conditions or "external" ones of funding, politics, and Zeitgeist. Teleological chronicles of the march of scientific progress can benefit from being reframed as historical narratives that understand scientific practices: these studies move from asking what knowledge is generated to asking how social psychological knowledge is produced. Studies of scientific practice (now an important subfield) seek to understand the social settings in which scientific knowledge is produced. In this way, Rutter demonstrates that science is not just about the ideas of individual scientists but about the social contexts in which science is produced.

Rutter's work is an important example of the need for a more sociological understanding of science. By examining the social contexts in which scientific knowledge is produced, rather than just the ideas of individual scientists, we can gain a more complete understanding of the process of scientific change. This approach also allows us to see how different social and cultural factors can influence the development of science, which is important for understanding the role of science in society.
difference between the objects of study in these two scientific domains. This distinction has crucial implications for social scientists. They have until now treated the claims made about them; they do not change as a result of new scientific claims made about them. By contrast, humans, the objects of study in psychotherapy, do change and respond to the claims made about them. Second, in the humanities the observers and object of observation are one and the same kind, and this reflexivity manifests in an array of empirical and theory implications. Finally, social knowledge and its making depend on the social world in important and inescapable ways that do not occur in the natural sciences. In other words, social knowledge is intrinsically culture-bound, as evidenced by the fact that it is unimaginable how we can know "even ourselves, except in terms that we acquire through living in a particular time and place. To conceive otherwise would be to conceive of having knowledge without language or symbol" (Smith, 1997, p. 17).

These essential conditions of the human sciences are not entirely unknown to social psychologists. In fact, social psychologists have been pre-eminent in responding, however tacitly, to the challenge of creating techniques and management in research situations. Perhaps because of such masterful laboratory management of reflexivity, researchers have neglected its fuller implications. We can turn to historical studies to better comprehend these intrinsic conditions of studying the human social life.

Reflexivity

In the opening pages of an exquisitely compiled history of the human sciences, Roger Smith states a core paradox of the human sciences, asking "How are we to stand back from the act of being human in order to observe what it is to be human? Even to attempt this standing back—and there are many ways in which it has been undertaken in pursuit of scientific truth—is a way of being human, that is, turn some other person will be able to study." He continues questioning, "are we then condemned to travel in self-reflecting circles, to create knowledge of human beings only to find that what has been done is to create another mode of life rather than a lasting truth?" (1997, p. 13). Smith broaches what Steve Woolgar (1988) calls the "horrors of reflexivity," and anticipates the dynamic, even generative consequences. He notes that the entire process of reflexive inquiry is taken up in the next section but it is first necessary to corral and identify the several meanings of this essential property of the human sciences.

According to Woolgar, at one meaning, reflexivity is the inescapable, self-referential attribute of theory. Reflexivity inheres in "all social sciences since any statement that holds humans act or believe in particular ways in particular circumstances refers to much as the social scientists as to anyone else" (Grunberg, 1978, p. 322). To be valid, social-psychology theory should be predictive or of explain the relevant thoughts and actions of the scientist in a way that can be compared against the actions of the scientists being observed in experiments. He described how both subjects and experimenters proceed with intentions and perceptions that are neither acknowledged nor represented in the experimental hypotheses. Social psychologists often make assumptions of what that that is "in" the subject but is not concerned with the psychological processes of the subjects or researchers' "unacknowledged intentions, Gordon Allport devoted much of his APA Presidential address (1940) to this matter, for instance, psychologists' privileging of quantification as a method of study. No less importantly, philosophical attempts that construe social psychology 

Although it is sometimes difficult or impossible to ascertain whether researchers' engagement with reflexivity is intended or not, its effects on research methodological outcomes (Morawski, 2005). The psychology experiment, Rosenzweig concluded, has an additional, largely unarticulated function that is concerning with researchers' "unacknowledged intentions, Gordon Allport devoted much of his APA Presidential address (1940) to this matter, for instance, psychologists' privileging of quantification as a method of study. No less importantly, philosophical attempts that construe social psychology 

If the psychological sciences largely disregarded substantive forms of reflexivity, there was a brief period when it did come under sustained scientific scrutiny. Beginning with the innovative social-psychological experiments of Martin Orne and Robert Rosenthal, some researchers began to assess the ways that experimenters' expectations and biases (as well of those of researchers influenced experimental outcomes. These experiments illuminated finding of common practices for reducing or eliminating such contamination. Although the methodological corrections were adopted by many, they target only readily detectable bias present at the observational stage of research. The correction, for the most part, leave unaddressed the first two forms of reflexivity discussed above. Important and potentially transformative research on these two other forms of reflexivity has followed more complex approaches. The self and the double hermeneutics of human science—can be informed by historical case studies. Analyses of pre-existing understandings of psychological phenomena circulating through the intellectual community (as in the case of long lingering in constructive of motivation). Histories of reflexivity affect means for interrogating not only past conceptions but also contemporary ones. They offer methods as well as analytic frameworks, for example, to locate the moral and religious values underlying current concepts of "happiness" and clinical and cultural conceptions of unconscious underlying current research on implicit attitudes.

Self-imaging, then, begat a scientific model of personhood. The reflexive play of self-regard/other regard at times has been influenced by scientists' direct experiences in research. In this respect, the role of science is to explore the relationship between the mind and embodiment. We may regard, Gigerenzer (1991, 1996) found that researchers' concerns about their own cognitive capacities—namely the accuracy of their judgments—led them to adopt techniques of statistical inference that they presumed to be superior to human decision making. The psychologists creatively drew upon these investigative tools to contest models of thinking, figuring the mind as extended that desideratum to describe human thought processes. Research tools, then, shaped a theory of mind.
Inadvertent reflexivity, the relay of self-conceptions and cultural conceptions (in and through social science) is ubiqui-
tous. Recent research on self-conceptions and the human mind has been forwarded by James, Bond, Rosenzweig, and Allport. Abyeance of reflexivity is understandable, especially in a science that seeks to differentiate its knowledge from common cultural understandings of social action. For enterprisers like social psychology, reflexivity evokes a "horror" that distinctions between social psychology and everyday social knowledge might collapse. That is, if research encompasses an adjudication between reflexive and pre-existing conceptions of human vulnerability along with defensive attitudes of Cold War American politics, some postwar researchers moved toward venting persons with (and needing) a certain protective self-psychology, and they described that self in terms that Catherine Lutz (1997) has called an "epistemology of the bunker." Cultural politics of personal war and covert warfare along with psychologists' war-related work experiences promoted a conflation of "a new more vigilant self, a self so much more explicitly disciplined as suspicious of itself" (p. 245).

Given apprehension of a dangerous world, the mind was recon-
ceived as having mechanisms to be protective and subversive, even self-subverting. This defensive yet vulnerable self made its appearance in empirical studies of compliance, coercion, denigration, and self-deception. It even prompted researchers to worry about subjects' possible subversions of experimental situations. Will events—or more accurately, perceptions of these events—engendered assumptions about the self? Cultural processes and the social models of human nature. In addition to conceiving a self radically and defensively separate from others, a conception that notably influenced research on person perception and social interaction, other notions of human subjects resonated with postwar culture, thereby bearing imprints of inadvertent reflexivity. Both a cognitively complex, resilient type of human and a vulnerable one traveled through social-psychological studies in the 1950s and 1960s. In a survival ritual of the ethical debates over the use of deception, Laura Stark (2010) corroborated the coexistence and livelihood of these two types of person. By the 1960s experimental research had become arguably the hottest concern of racial politics; its prominence is evidenced by the attention given it by the APA committee mandated to develop ethical principles for research with human subjects. Apprehending the need to be a "true" psychologist in research, the APA sought to pre-empt that undesirable outcome by producing its own regulations. The committee's deliberations over whether it was appropriate to deceive subjects about the ridicule nature of the experiment. On the one hand, taking subjects as vulnerable and susceptible to influence implied the need to restrict the use of deception techniques. On the other hand, the committee-supplied rationale cited the need to mask the suggested that a modicum of deception would have no adverse or lasting effects. Legal, economic, and political contingencies, then, charged debates over basic assumptions of personhood and ultimate resolution of conflicting points of view.

Making the social

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The feedbacks through which scientific practices (methods, theory, and epistemology) engage and co-constitute ontology (the world) are clearly evident. In survey research, for example, the survey respondent designates the ordinary person as the subject and ultimately also consumer of the resultant knowledge. Survey data influence both the public sphere and individuals, providing the latter with a change in the context of themselves. Survey findings often describe the public and individuals' patterns of living, and they have come to serve as prescriptions for living. They entice people to ask questions and seek answers—about what is important about them, what is changing about them, and what specific ways they approximate or diverge from the norm. Survey research is often "engaged" to filter their experiences through tables and percentages, to fit themselves into social scientific categories and to identify with strangers" (Parle, 1994). To make a point, individuals were not always readily compliant participants or recipients of the findings. Just as they came to see themselves and alter their consciousness of self and others, so they sometimes spoke up, contesting what was measured or researchers' interpretations of the measurements collected. If researchers cherished reformist or predictive aims—as did Alfred Kinsey, to unleash individuals from social myths and conventions—massive, nearly ubiquitous uses of survey techniques to probe virtually every aspect of life had the effect of making "statistical citizenship" the reality about themselves through newspapers, magazines, television, textbooks, and the internet. Surveys soon become part of everyday thinking about society and a pertinent source of self-formation, part of understanding the public and oneself. They served to delineate a "mass public" and "shaped the selves who would inhabit society, affecting everything from beliefs about morality and individuals to visions of the future" (Igo, 2007).

These cases illustrate historical ontological, the dynamic looping of self and knowledge about selves, but do not presume it to be a matter of social construction, some top-down scientific invention of human objects (Hacking, 1999). Instead, they detail the co-constitution of scientific knowledge and human forms (ontology), showing such co-constituting to involve cognitive imaginations, economic arrangements, social structures, material conditions, and more. The ensuing rhetoric of fluctuating hormones, emphasis on negative symptoms, and the new nomenclature of PMS (premenstrual syndrome) trumped contrasting social-psychological studies that reported considerable cultural factors. Biologically inflected rhetoric likewise obscured narratives that work that was situated in the life cycle, reported situational (not biological) influences on women's and men's moods, and detected methodological contaminants in some research (Hedstrom, 1994). On these occasions, heightened attention promoted the idea of premenstrual syndrome as a reasonable explanation of women's experiences.

The language researchers take their scientific language very seriously. Curing precise statements about the human world and scripting operative terms with impressively skill, they have achieved a rigorous regulation of language, producing a manual of style that surpasses other disciplines in its comprehensiveness. It is, however, highly specific, and the language of psychology is taken for granted; that is, words are taken to have more or less accurately to some aspect of reality or to denote some natural entity or event. While serving important epistemic and methodological commitments, this view of language—with its "virtual obfuscation of personal opinion stated as such" (Brown, 1991, p.135)—also under-appreciates the language these generalizations themselves, and rhetoric. The effects of hormonal cycles was scant, although there existed popular conception of women's impaired psychological functioning at certain times in the menstrual cycle along with accompanying arguments that this impairment affects women's performance. With researchers' call for better-designed studies, the matter of women's periodicity soon garnered attention, yet this rising interest came not only from the feminist researchers themselves but also from differently interested groups, including medical researchers, physicians, clinical psychologists, pharmaceutical companies, and consumers. Further, researchers' demand for studies that distinguished between cultural and biological influences had the inadvertent effect of bifurcating the research program: Medical and life scientists seized the biological domain, leaving psychologists to investigate cultural and psychological ones. The research agenda thus was divided and feminist psychologists sidelined from important discussions. The extensive if fractured interludes along with revivified "hormone talk" ultimately if inadvertently manufactured the more accurate understanding, namely, that cultural and biological gender differences. The very scientific focus raised public visibility of the matter. Also, the concomitant dramatic growth in pharmaceutical industry and emergence of biomedical visions reinforced the notion.

The names given to psychological phenomena and the narrative accounts through which knowledge is relayed, therefore, carry meanings besides or beyond proximal and technical ones. Historians of the social sciences have paid more attention to language, observation, and the discourses of science, and not to the way that knowledge is relayed. The principal medium in which sociologists formed their purposes, and in which they represented those purposes as true and legitimate (Ross, 2003, p. 207). The "linguistic turn" was taken by many working in the human and social sciences (but not psychology) prompted attention to the work that words actually do and the essential yet flexible ways that narratives are deployed to structure explanations (White, 1973). Heeding the linguistic turn, some historians excavate the language of social psychology, and their investigations illuminate the field's uses of metaphor, narrative, and rhetoric.

**Metaphor**

Perhaps no literary device in science has been subject to more investigation than the metaphor. The question of what scientists themselves as well as philosophers, linguists, and historians suggest "that metaphor is not only a form of speech but fundamentally a form of thought, having basic epistemological functions" (Leary, 1990, p. 1; emphasis in original).

Metaphors are ubiquitous in all the sciences, and the more potent forms ones form the basis of our conceptual vision, inviting us to place the world in a different light. Metaphors can, however, also, to recognize some previously unseen yet revelatory similarity between the two things. Metaphors are at once cognitive construction and powerfully constrains thought. By defining a particular object metaphorically we arouse expectations, focus attention on certain features, and thereby indicate certain priorities for practical action (Danziger, 1990b, 1990c).

Theories of mental life have significantly relied upon extended metaphors. Nineteenth-century psychologists, neurologists, and psychologists drew on metaphors of energy from physics to describe mental functions; they eventually took the mind to be a system of nervous energy, which then would produce mental dysfunctions such as neurasthenia and neurosis if disrupted or interrupted. The idea of mental energy with its limits and disturbances remains, framing everyday notions of stress and fatigue as well as scientific models of cognition.

Examining psychology's language of affect, James Allerli (1990) identified five major metaphors in modern research on emotion, i.e., theories of emotions drawn on metaphors of physical process and responses; animal nature; driving forces or vital energies; diseases of the mind; and inner experiences. Each of these metaphors call attention to particular images of psychic or social life; each disregards or denies other features. Locating these central metaphors provided the basis for imagining a sixth—emotions as social roles—that Allerli developed as important metaphors in understanding the dramatic changes in social psychological research. Allerli suggests, for example, that the "role metaphor" admires the symbolic nature of emotions, highlighting the "role that emotions play within the social system, as well as any biological and psychological functions they might have" (p. 127). Although not a sole means of linguistic analysis, historical studies can complement critical theory's studies of contemporary culture (Boje, 1994) and vice versa, is as the case with the language of emotions adopted in psychology. Historian Omnel Dör (1998) examination of late 19th-century laboratory experiments on emotion documents how emotion came to be taken as internal, physiological (determinated) states. He found that those empirical studies of emotion were undertaken with the aim of creating laboratory and clinical conditions in which the subject is not in an emotive state and hence could serve as a superior object for experimentation or patient for physiological examination. Rendering emotions as bodily states greatly advanced their measurement and strengthened the relations between the laboratory and more objective observations. Dör's history of laboratory work on emotion thus helps explain the specific metaphors that Allerli identified in contemporary emotion research.
through an implicit assumption that scripts impose limits on persons' roles and, therefore, on their behavior. Assuming that behavioral scripts impinge on a processual paradigm eclipses certain aspects of the self-social, notably the vicissitudes of self-reflection, interactive behaviors, and intersubjective experiences. Further, the metaphors that2 argue8 that the self is constructed, then, an intuitive language may be seen as constitutive of practice rather than simply representational. Accordingly, MacArthur and Winston examined discussions of experimentation in "terms of the terminology and rhetorical structures of the discipline, which it was constituted, variations in the way in which it was constructed and used within and across texts, and the possible functions of the way in which it was deployed" (p. 352). Comparison of Gardner Murphy and Lois Murphy's and Kurt Lewin's writings on research reveals how the latter enthusiastically and persuasively promoted the experiment as the central method in the discipline. Among the rhetorical tactics, Lewin foregrounded himself as exemplar; assiduously avoided examining grand assertions made about experimentation; invoked feelings of a social psychological community; and offered tautological strategies between the objects of social psychology and those of the physical sciences. Lewin's selective rhetoric compels a specific science, thereby providing substantively more directive than more description or representation of actual scientific practices (see also Danziger, 1993; Kore, 1997).

Research methods textbooks have also played an important pedagogical role in promoting experimentation. A series of textbooks, sociological critique allegedly to contain a justificatory rhetoric along with defensive argumentation interviewing to anticipate critical criticisms. In the 1950s, textbook authors began to actively defend experimentation and denigrate other conceptions of social psychology research (Stam, Radke, & Lubeck, 1980). They proclaimed a monolithic, systematic method in a field in which there existed at the time no certainty or consensus about either the origins of study or appropriate methods of inquiry. Not surprisingly, these accounts contain inconsistencies with what Stam et al. call "rhetorical strains." Prominent among the idea of rational experimenter and intuitive scien
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tures insecurities about the experiment as ideal method and the elimination of method that, between the nature of subjects as passively subservient and as subversively threatening, and between a fun-and-games attitude toward experi

Theology is an important field of study because it provides a foundation for understanding the nature of God, the universe, and human existence. As a student of theology, you may want to explore different areas of study, such as systematic theology, biblical studies, or church history. To succeed in your studies, it is important to develop a strong foundation in the core concepts and to understand the historical context in which these ideas developed.

In the realm of systematic theology, you will study the nature of God, salvation, and the purpose of the universe. Biblical studies involve the analysis of the Bible, its historical context, and its significance for contemporary issues. Church history explores the development of Christian doctrine and practice from the time of Jesus to the present day. Each of these areas offers unique insights into the nature of faith and how it can be applied to modern challenges.

To engage in theological study, you will need to develop critical thinking skills, the ability to understand and interpret texts, and the capacity to engage in principled debate. You will also need to be open to diverse perspectives and willing to learn from those who hold different views.

To succeed in your theological education, it is important to have a solid foundation in the liberal arts, including philosophy, history, and literature. These disciplines provide a broader understanding of the human experience and help you develop the critical thinking skills necessary for theological study. Additionally, participating in community service and engaging with people from diverse backgrounds can enrich your understanding of the world and help you apply your knowledge in practical ways.

In conclusion, theology is a rich and rewarding field of study that offers insights into the nature of faith and its application to contemporary issues. By developing a strong foundation in the core concepts and understanding the historical context in which these ideas developed, you can make significant contributions to the ongoing dialogue about the nature of God and the purpose of the universe.
life found their old approaches wanting and forswore them totally, at the same time that novices in the field were being taught (abandoned) footnotes and other arcane texts, the world was made up with words. On the contrary, language analysis can appreciate the real as it is discursively given form and meaning and how, in turn, semantic forms are constitutive of that reality. Critically appraising rhetorical commonplaces, conflicts and elisions, for instance, permits better seeing how "rationality" and "irrationality" came to be affiliated to certain forms of decision making and decision makers (Lopes, 1991).

Examining, for instance, the years 1945 to 1970s, psychological and sociological research reported fairly competent decision-making among experimental subjects whereas later research found nontrivial, even befuddled decision-making. The bias and heuristics literature arising in the 1980s abounded with clever and engaging experimental designs, intentions of reviewers' superior judgment, and ambiguous slippage from description of "heuristics" to that of "bias." That research also incorporated a repetitive, evaluative language regarding what is "rational" and what is "irrational." Not surprisingly, the popular press echoed researchers' descriptions of subjects' judgments as "ludicrous," "indefensible," and "self-defeating" (Lopes quoting Tversky and Kahneman, p. 80). The reality of that irrationality, Lopes concluded, "is mostly in the rhetoric" (p. 80).}

Studies advance a larger project to better understand scientific practices beyond abstract philosophical notions of them.

Practices

Historians and science studies scholars are exploring questions about how science happens in the world, how knowledge is made, and how scientific knowledge happens in science. In lieu of documenting scientific achievements and presuming certain epistemological precepts, they ask, how is science produced? The question is direct, yet the answers are variable. Seeing scientific production as practice impels fuller appreciation of the myriad tools, actors, social relations, resources, languages, and material conditions through which knowledge is imagined, generated, validated, and shared. (Many of the studies of scientific language and reflexivity, although treated separately in this chapter, fit within the purview of scientific practices.) The move from asking why the how of science shifts analytic emphasis from theory to method, foregrounding instruments, experiments, cognitive styles or persons, marketing, and social exchanges. For some scholars, understanding scientific practice ultimately entails a "decentering" of the human subject (Pickering, 1995), acknowledging plural realities (Law, 2004), or mapping affinities among actors and actants or networks (Latour, 2005). Investigations of practice sometimes trouble cherished tenets found, for example, that against beliefs that science is unified and orderly, it can be dismissed (Gallison, 1996). Studies of scientific practice are especially promising for social psychology with its complex and rich connections with private as well as social life (Daston and Galison, 2007; Kellner, 1985, 1994; Porter, 1994).

As evidenced with statistics, political alliances and social imperatives influenced seemingly unlikely projects of instru- mentation, marketing, editing, and recording scientific devices. In other words, even presumed stable epistemic matters such as quantification convey political and moral commitments and change over time. They emerge, grow, and sometimes pass away. "Objectivity" too is illustrative of this liveliness of episte- mology: Its appearance and alterations over the past two centuries are closely tied to changes in conceptions of human subjectivity, machine technologies, gender, and professional identity (Daston and Galison, 2007; Daston and Galison, 2007; Kellner, 1985, 1994; Porter, 1994).

Attention to investigative practices ultimately exposes the extensiveness of science, revealing how knowledge—its inception, execution, and reception—involves commerce, personal lives, governments, economics, technologies, material cultures, and social arrangements. Such studies chart the vibrancy of scientific practices: the back and forth relays of information, materials, techniques, and customs between what demarcated as "science" and "culture." These capacious relays can be productive of new events and objects, generating novel events and entities and indicating that scientific objects change. For instance, shifts in modern economics are fully explicable only by considering its tools, theories, changes in the economic world, and the interactions of economics and modern economics influences the economic world as it feeds models and instruments to explain it. Taking account of these extended practices explains how "the economic science of the 20th century has, in the irreversibility of its engineering interventions in the economy, engendered new economic events, 'to be reckoned with by new generations of economists'" (Morgan, 2003, p. 305). Similarly, the classification of multiple personality changed over the 20th century in response to new evidence, imported assessment techniques and theories, and changes in the phenomenon itself—in those individuals classified as such (Hacking, 1995b). It is this full sense of the historical and social come to be real and historical, weighty with biographical detail, and traveling across delineated boundaries of science and culture.

There are several distinctive features of social psychology that make the field at once an enticing and also a challenging candidate for study of scientific practices. First, the discipline's intimate relationships to social life—its direct relevance to nearly all social interaction—and its long history of research that has been put to work in addressing social connections outside the discipline (Goode, 2000). Perceiving the extended and extensive circuits prepares us to ask, what have been the effects of such circuits? What do such tools look like? How do trades of resources and ideas transpire? With what consequences? Apprehending this circuitry likewise invites asking how might social psychology alter its scientific objects? This chapter has shown how a reverse view of the field from the elite group of decision-makers with experts, and a culture of suspiciousness about truth claims (Porter, 1986, 1994, 1995). Statisticians thereby promised "truths" that transcended those based on privilege, tradition, character, or brute political power.
The second feature of social psychology that distinguishes its practices is its methods, specifically the harnessing of methods of its master discipline (psychology) to study social, external influences on behavior. Modern social psychology has adopted and adapted methods fabricated for studying interior states and deployment them to investigate what might be very different sorts of worldly phenomena—real-world events. How was this transformation of intrapsychic methods onto educational social affairs affected? With what consequences? How has what we take to be "social" changed through these investigations, especially, aspects of the social space where findings are reported? Such methods seem to have been largely disdoned! Social psychology's distinctive practices thus are most evident in two arenas: its methods and objects of inquiry. Examining the field's methods exposes some of the ways that everyday sociality was translated to render it amenable to precision research techniques. And close analysis of the objects of research uncovers overlooked moral and political premises that accompany empirical work.

**Methods**

The social psychology attached to (and located within) psychology has substantively utilized the principal methods of psychology, consequently privileging experimental techniques, quantification, and individual-centered procedures (despite the lingering mobilization of other methodologies). Atypical and "textbooks" nearly singular concentration on experimentation omits discussing that method's philosophical and epistemological presuppositions. Yet the design and implementation of research methods are far more than an empirical social matter. They involve extensive negotiations among researchers that are often guided by ideals of efficiency, expediency, and aesthetics as well as epistemic ones. Sometimes these negotiations are internal to the science, as is the case with the invention of "variables." The history of "variables"—the coming into being of a uniform, mandatory technique in experimentation—shows how this psychological ontology was crucial to the making of consensus among researchers. Identifying a laboratory entity or event as a "variable" greatly reduced observational variability. It also invoked a sense of observer neutrality and promoted an engineering attitude through which research was more readily translatable into social life outside the lab (Danziger, 1977; Winston, 1988, 1990, 2004; Winston & Blais, 1996). The emergence of variables occurred over a short period of time and entailed transforming 19th-century terminology and operations of statistics into signifiers of psychological constructs. Disbanding common talk of stimuli and response variables began in the 1930s, and by the 1950s "variable" came to be used to "refer to anything that was the object of psychological investigation" (Danziger, 1997, p. 167). Events happening within the organism (initially described as "invariant vari- ables") could become part of observable reality. Introduction of variables sidetracked matters of subjective meaning: As variables shifted from being a statistical concept to a natural, psychological force, researchers could more readily translate common cultural understandings into precise, measurable ones; cultural importations, then, acquired scientific life. The birth of what is variable in what was once fictional and what was real, and that fictional/realist equivalence still poses "persistent dilemmas" for social scientists and critics alike. Milgram himself appreciated (both directly and indirectly) the ideological alliances between real and fictional, sometimes blurring distinctions between them. He wrote a paper promoting Candid Camera as social science, and while relying on his own work at M.I.T. in 1965, he described himself as "an ambivalent of science and art" (quoted in McCarthy, p. 32). It is not surprising, then, that Philip Zimbardo identified Funt, Milgram, and himself as intellectual grandsons of Kurt Lewin.

Seeing these connections, especially in a classic experiment, compels us to ask how researchers distinguish realism from pretense of reality, from enactings and mappings? How do we come to decide what about the social stuff of everyday life—or laboratory life—is real? Common confusions between artifice and real, performance and authenticity, thus raise a central epistemological question: What about the social is "real"? And how do we know this real of the social? Approximating how epistemic decisions are intricately tied to commercial culture and political ideals opens the way for potentially insightful, if complex, reflection on how these decisions are made in contemporary research. Are the recent virtual reality replicates of Milgram's experiments as real as Milgram's experiments? Are the simulato- riums of his experiment? And are any of these as real as everyday reality? If Milgram's scientific premise—"that social psychologists should not leave untouched if research is to accurately inform us about the social world. These questions are not only historical ones but remain concerns of contemporary research, in part, they exemplify how historical reflection can provide background lighting for better seeing persistent if sometimes latent scientific problems in current research.

Ian Nicholson (in press), too, examines Milgram's project in terms of cultural atmosphere of the era, namely the postwar thinking about masculinity. His detailed analysis of the experimental design, confederates, actors, subjects, and experiment- er's self-regard reveals the circulation of anxiety-inflected representations of masculinity. In those documents he found that Milgram’s experiments, and institutionalized sensation signal might have been about the determination of manhood, and with a dispossession of the directed-innate director, and arrival of the compliant organizational man, these worries were taken to be significant. They affected and confounded the images and the surrender to authority. Milgram's studies addressed (and his results further indicated) these very concerns about masculinity by creating an experimental version of the broader cultural context. Many of the assertions concerning Milgram's research program's central and dramatic representation of masculinity is further evidenced in Milgram's persons. Nicholson drew upon archival materials and published accounts of Milgram's behavior and personal style that describe him as often harsh and interpersonal detached—fitting the cultural idea of masculinity in that period. Additional evidence of the configuration of a scientific experimental setting fully furnished with machinery, shock, and danger. In its rudimentary theoric form, the experimental situ- ation was gendered through featuring "a man using technology to do something to another man. And another man's authority" (p. 22). Even the ethical criticisms of Milgram's project contain a gendered subject. Additionally, Milgram has long observed, and counted, the "losing gender seemed uninterested in female performances. Of the 1,000 subjects who participated in the experiments, 969 were male; men alone served in 17 of the 18 experimental conditions; and only in a 1974 publication did Milgram comment on the female participants. He never explained their near absence among the ranks of experimenters, confederates, and subjects. His analysis informed by recent work on what previously stood as an unmarked category, "masculinity." Nicholson noted how masculinity, as a stereotype and a social way of being, actually permeated a scientific project. Here again historical investigations excavate and bring to the fore practical and moral premises that are not readily observed or examined in otherwise precise scientific work. Common or tacit ways of being, like masculine ideals in the postwar era, transpire within research projects; historical inquiry makes us aware of an unacknowledged abyss of analysts of social psychology's most renowned experiment failed to observe this significant feature (an exception is Stam et al., 1998).

Overall, studies of Milgram's classic experiment find a place among contemporary histories of science that aim to "understand science of the past in its own terms, reconstructing the reasonableness if not timeliness of the rationality of the arguments on sides" (Daston, 2009, p. 802). McCarthy and Nicholson's studies demonstrate such relations, and they perceptively accord with philosopher of science Joseph Roue's observation that "a period practice can only be reconstrued as an effort to reconstruct the world in the image of the laboratory" (2006, p. 11).

Social psychology's enthusiastic adoption of experimental techniques introduced major challenges to isolate, define, and measure "social" phenomena without altering those often elusive entities. And the multifold transportation of psychology's experimental techniques to the study of social phenomena testifies to the difficulty of (in the language of Foucault) "-inscription and "deception" (all techniques refined and commonly employed by social psychologists) intimate the challenges of applying techniques designed to individual events to investigate social ones. One important tech- nique invented to make the psychology laboratory more amenable to investigating the social is the confederate. The role of confederate is that of the "spur," a toy used to elicit pre-existing social types such as the confidence man or the earlier manifestation, the trickster. Yet at the same time these individuals introduced into the laboratory a modern, technological equivalent of ghosts. The confederate is at a name and
social actor and also a nonsocial entity, taken to be a stimulus relaying information and whose nonrecognition presence (by the individual subject) precedes (by the experimental subject). Betty Beyer’s (1998) comprehensive historical survey located an array of social-psychology phantoms that have taken nonnal forms of confederates, stooges, paid participants, bogus pipes—lines, false feedback, accomplices, cover stories, cynomancy, and the like. These phantoms “denaturalize the ‘nature’ of scientific relations and investigative practices” thereby representing “abolishing human subjectivity in experiments (time, materiality or relationships) and endowing mechanization with phantasmic (invisible) powers” (Bayer, 1998, p. 189).

Vested with this special subjectivity and scientific essence, “Phantoms make seemable not only how scientific discourse constructs the boundaries between subjectivity and objectivity, but also how scientific discourse trades guise and disguise off one another to bring these very entities into being” (p. 195). At once made visible and invisible, phantoms help realize new understandings of persons in which personal or information processing can become foregrounded and the concrete social relations of labo-

Debriefing practices have a similarly rich life involving the trade of cultural practices and scientific ones. Ben Harris (1998) detailed chronicle of “debriefing” found the word’s origination in warfare practices: It has a paradoxical history “in the adoption of a military metaphor for an ethical desideratum” (p. 189). The practice was variously reconfigured over the course of experimental use, ambiguously changing who was to undergo what deception without giving away the game. Debriefing, without such shifts, debriefing practices apparently served to satisfy two research problems: one ethical (to achieve honesty in research) and one practical (to limit confounds, reduce contamination of experiments). Perhaps as significant, however, was how it technical, bureaucratic origins bestowed added legitimacy on social psychologists’ experimental roles and authority.

A second social psychological tool important for sociologists who, like other psychologists, sought to grasp the subject’s naiveté during experimentation but who also needed means to recreate experimental conditions as similar to the social world as possible. James Kerr’s (1997) expansive history shows how deception techniques were formulated and legitimated on cultural as well as academic and scientific grounds. Attaining the desired experimental realism involved creating “illusions of reality” that would engage subjects and persuade colleagues of the validity of experiments. Deception importantly served the goal of realism yet it was made possible by the nonrecognition presence. Longstanding cultural ideas reflected these understandings. The acceptability of deception depended on individualist values with its logic “that it was all right to break the law because, as indicated by the states, their action was more important than harm” and those others would care because of the positive outcomes (p. 163). Deceptive practices were enabled, too, by a cultural concept of experts as beneficent along with experts’ paternalist “view that sometimes people should be helped even if they don’t ask for it because they are made to do is for their own good and is something they later will appreciate.” Problems (by the experimenter) set for empiricist science to intervene with methodologies which can constrain the individual from the non-rational” (Henriques, Holway, Urwin, Venus, & Walkerdine, 1984, p. 30, researchers have typically proceeded with the assumption that their empiri-

cism is without politics or morals or that any political or moral origins of their work are removed from empirical research. More often than not, any sociological scientific practice has fostered general abeyance of other cultural knowledge that is imported into research and sometimes becomes essential components in the staging of experiments.

Historical studies uncover just how moral and political matters enter into and circulate through research programs. In doing so, they also signal how our scientific artifacts are not pre-existing forms to be discovered in controlled, observational situations. Rather, our objects come to us as both embodied and imagined in their emergences. What is routinely taken as the scientific discovery or observation of objects thus needs to be supplemented with better understanding of how scientific objects take shape and can change. Such inquiries illuminate the “ontological fecundity of the sciences” both inside and outside designated scientific spaces (Daston, 2000). In their liveliness, scientific objects can and often do come to resemble the categories formally ascribed to them either through particular hypotheses or the experimental roles they are assigned.

"Socialization," a key object in social psychology’s past that recently gained personal significance, exemplifies an object that was neither wholly “discovered” through empirical research nor simply borrowed from ordinary language or common understandings (Morawski & St. Martin, 2011). In its 19th-century usage, socialization explicitly referred to an economic arrangement of production: It referred to a social organization out there in the world. Shortly afterwards, socialization came to be tied to even more abstract, even more world and individuals: It was taken to be an interactive object, described as such in the writings of sociologist Georg Simmel. (Even the 1934 Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences defines and attributes the term “socialization” to Karl Marx’s definition as a particular social organization of industry, and notes as well Simmel’s definition of socialization as a process of group formation and association was the second of the 20th century, and before budding psychology, primarily concerned with how society "took the word to describe a process whereby individuals learn and internalize social conventions. This definition turned on revised "socialization" as a biological metaphor to reach the 20th century, and before budding psychology, primarily concerned with how sociocultural knowledge as that happens within the individual as a response or accommodation to social forces. By mid-

century, socialization appeared as a trichotomy: a concept variously combining notions of adaptation, learning, conformity,
identification, internaiization, conditioning, assimilation, unconscious drives, attitudes, personality, culture, social norms, and the very idea of "human nature." The chapter on socialization begins by presenting the idea of social psychology by stating "socialization refers to a process which is old and pervasive in human life—the process of how to rear children so that they will become adequate members of the society to which they belong." The author also noted that "the use of a relatively uniform label for socialization in scientific discussion is new, and there is not even yet complete agreement on the terminology" (Child, 1954, p. 655). This was a rare caveat, for social psychology had become a lively and coherent field as a valid construct in textbooks as well as empirical studies. As Theodore Newcomb instructed student readers of his 1930 social psychology textbook, socialization was a bonaparte social psychological object showing "in common with other members of your group, you have interiorized many social norms so that they are now part of your own psychological make-up. They present the social facts to indicate what you are, in Urie Bronfenbrenner's words, "a matter of social rather than biological inheritance" (1970, p. xxv). By this time, however, nascent cognitive psychology's conceptions of flexible, rational actors were already reshaping conceptions of socialization, enabling Lawrence Kohlberg to propose that socialization must be understood in terms of "active processes of information-gathering, strategizing, motivated thinking," the entire person (1969, p. 349).

The evolution of social as a scientific object, therefore, was not driven simply by empirical findings, nor was the concept itself submitted to much empirical testing. There aimed no systematic or comparative examination of the various mechanisms attributed to the socialization process, and its definition often remained an odd admixture of what were taken as discordant theories (combining behaviorism, psychoanalysis, role theory, and more). By the postwar period socialization stood as an established object, a thing done by or happening to individuals, a task supposed to support the continued social human capacity. Even today, few researchers and laypersons question the object's existence, and socialization endures as a common and effective explanation of behavior (Morosz and St. Louis, 1965).

The very idea of the "social" has an even more complex history. Given the ontological, political, and practical implications of any definition of the social, historians have investigated the limits of central conceptions of social psychology; a definition generally attributed to Ford Allport's 1924 text, successfully displaced theories about the way individuals are socially constituted, their perceptions mediated through social arrangements, ongoing interactions, and agreements. For John Greenwood (2004), abandoning theories in favor of an individual-centered orientation (and a conception of the social individual) literally affected a "disappearance of the social." As discussed above, adherence to an individualist definition of the social has significant cultural, economic, and political implications. It has permitted making social psychological knowledge that is compatible with prevailing political beliefs about individual responsibility, social citizenship, and work ethics (Rose, 1998; 1999). Social constructions of virtual media and the physics of social psychology's modern enterprise accordingly fits with larger systems of competition and exchange: Its conceptualization of the social seeks the focus on experience at the level of the individual. As a consequence, social psychological knowledge encourages people "to accept or change in their subjective experiences as a substitute for changes in the objective objects." Social processes have been for several years (1981, p. 735). Macromaterialist histories indicate how the presupposition of a certain kind of individualism has yielded knowledge that is well suited to the societal regulation and administration of individuals (Dunzinger, 1998; Heimera, 1984; et al., Rose; 1998).

The absolutism of such mainstream presuppositions is evidenced in failed if ingenious attempts to promote alternative conceptions of social object. For example, sociologist Michael S. Schudson's effort to critically reframe biomedicine's new conception of persons' vitality, capacities, experiences, and responsibilities (Rose, 2007) What would come from considering performativity, a theoretical perspective that understands psychic experience in terms of the powers of speech and language to regulate action (Butler, 1997; Sedgwick, 2003)?

This chapter's conclusion, then, ends by looking forward and moving backward by asking what social psychology could accomplish by taking its reflexive circuit as a working conceptualization. Consider for a moment how scientific investigations can make new entities (e.g., "cognitive dissonance," "stress," "Freudian slip") and how new entities can arise in the social world (e.g., "virtue reality," "transgender," "surrogate mothers"). These inventions—discoveries, in turn, create further opportunities and capacities for scientific (to study) and other persons (to incorporate or resist). The discoveries, makeings and namings of our social entities always entail relays of understanding and acting between science and the rest of culture. This becomes a degree of"psychological" understanding. But leaving our schools for a career of unemployment became victims of arrested emotional intellectual development; our civil liberties fall short of our expressed ideal" (quoted in M. Shepard, 2004). And yet, our colleagues these unfortunate conditions called for an expanded understanding of both democracy and the individual as socially situated. They also proposed what Pawelski called "modernizing" what is possible, what is possible, given the social psychology's ability to exert the pursuit of scientific knowing that would connect reason with morals and feeling. They beckoned the generation of scientific knowledge that would challenge conventional understandings of persons and the world that psychology had assumed.

Looking forward while looking back

Histories (beyond canonical chronicles) illuminate vibrant scientific landscapes upon which social psychologists can more fully and accurately appraise the field's fundamental assumptions and commitments. They show the vital connectivity of science, including fertile connections between theory and methods, scientific objects and cultural life, social psychologists and creative entertainers, and psychological models and economic outcomes. Questions of what makes scientific constructs as distinct as quanta metal objects, with their spectacular appeal. When social psychology considers the social world, ordinary actors, scientific practices, and the scientific that serves to account for the psychological objects, for despite stolid presuppositions that social psychological phenomena stand still—that they are fixed, unchanging processes or entities—historical narratives of circuits and their loops subtly suggest otherwise. History is significant, then, not only for providing tools for reappraising the language, techniques, moral bases, and practical consequences of contemporary research but also for suggesting opportunities for doing science.

Should imagining the theoretical possibilities of historical thinking seem far beyond the purview of social psychology, history itself offers insight. Wilhelm Wundt, a "founder" of modern scientific psychology, proposed that one main avenue of psychology be volkspsychologie or folk psychology, and that this strand of scientific psychology would deploy historical methods to gather, record, and analyze the facts of "folk culture" (Kroger & Schreibe, 1990). Another founding figure, G. Stanley Hall, categorized psychology's structure as through a "society of connected individuals" and its historical approaches. The historical would trace the lives of all "finished systems," including those of comparative and experimental psychology (Leary, 2009). Indeed, in psychology's nascent decades journals published historical and cultural articles, although this diversity was short-lived and its proponents are all but forgotten (Petit, 2008).

The prophecies of Wundt and Hall along with their contemporaries William James, G. Stanley Hall, and Edward Titchener remind us that no single method was advanced as sufficient for the challenge of understanding and explaining mental life. These founders from the outset appreciated the value as well as advantages of any single method. They understood that the ontology of mind, brain, behavior, and society amounted to more than invariance and mechanics and that its constitution also involved accommodations, emergencies, mutations, and evolution. This yet unrealized project affords social psychologists with capacious opportunities for investigating the dynamics of the social-psychological world.

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