The trouble with culturally diverse theory in feminist psychology is that everything is trouble. We begin with a paradox: Feminist thinking in the social sciences (and of critical thought in general) has generated provocative and trenchant analyses that simultaneously render the most basic tools, language, and even the very institution of science problematic. Over the past 25 years, feminist and critical psychologists have uncovered the androcentric axes structuring what is taken to be “psychology” and what psychologists aspire to when we make “theory.” They have uncovered unsettling components that comprised our traditional categories of “woman” and “gender.” Such critical scrutiny has revealed troublesome implications that arise from studying cultural diversity, including problems with the

From the outset, our task is to approach the possibility of cultural diverse theory in psychology par excellence, and we are discovered that we could do nothing less than make trouble. Here, we encounter Judith Butler’s mapping of gender trouble and are indebted to her extensive analyses. We also thank Melanie Allen, Hope Landrum, Rosten Mandelson, Scott Fieser, and Robert Stodol for their critical readings and suggestions. Preparation of this chapter was supported in part by a Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada Doctoral Fellowship awarded to Betty M. Bayer.
notions of race, class, and diversity itself. And, to add paradox to paradox, even the newest correctives to the totalizing nature of these categories are creating havoc as some feminist scholars have identified nontrivial, if latent, problems with these "postmodern," "interpretive" and "relativist" alternatives to the conventional perspective.

Such impasses in knowledge production are not accidental. The gateway to theories of knowing has not been locked by the workings of happenstance, but by pervasive and long-standing social and political conditions (Kahn & Yoder, 1989; Moravski, 1988). A sense of impasse has been one paradoxical outcome of the success of feminist work. For instance, some of the few feminist scholars who have achieved substantial recognition within academia have done so, in part, by devising abstracted, dense, and universalizing theories. In other words, they have advanced by undertaking the abstract theorizing common to androcentric science rather than engaging feminist activism or pedagogy. Similarly, many feminist researchers have worked to recover and privilege "women's experience." Yet, all too frequently their efforts have resulted in the reification of the categories that sustain oppressive relations; thus, research on women's experience tends to "repeat our litany of woe, a repetition of clichés and stereotypes about victims and heroines" (Marks, 1985, p. 105). From these paradoxes and impasses, one may sense that everything is trouble in the making of culturally diverse theories. Nevertheless, in following this step, we must be mindful of: (a) some troubles may be the accompaniments of feminist psychologists' successes in countering the conventions of a sexist world and, at the same time, (b) some troubles may derive from long-standing and recurrent resistances to feminism.

We also must be mindful of the fact that although the successes of feminist inquiry may be paradoxical, they are not necessarily tautological; we need not end where we began—with exclusive and oppressive worldview. In trying to envision how we might create more inclusive theories (meaning that the theories are grounded in sociohistorical meanings of race, class, gender, and ethnicity), we are inevitably engaged in an historical dialectic with past theoretical constructions. As feminist psychologists we are in a liminal space—that place in ritualized passage between and between what has been assumed to be real and possible, however problematic those assumptions, and what awaits our imaginative envisioning (Moravski, 1994).

This chapter is an adventure in and through such thresholds of liminality, an excursion aspiring to inspire metamorphoses of theory making. We discuss problematic areas of contemporary theory work and some specific places of liminality to reconfigure not only categories and constructs but also scientific practice itself. We also discuss several strategies for shifting from a practice of problematics—paradoxes and impasses—to a practice of possibilities.

MAKING CATEGORICAL REALITIES

It is not that psychology has failed historically to incorporate the concepts of race, class, gender, and sexual orientation, but rather that it has constituted them through a set of premises that exclude and privilege. Part of the critical work of theory making involves relinquishing the hold that traditional, empiricist paradigms have on these concepts. This work proceeds first by understanding how conventional concepts serve a particular social order. As such, it entails interrogation of psychology's theoretical commitment to certain definitions of gender, ethnicity, race, and class. In such interrogations, we ask who and what has benefited from these definitions. It also requires an examination of the extent to which these definitions constrain social relations as hierarchical, relatively static, and universal. In doing this kind of critical work, we must, as Haraway (1989) remarked, "look always through the lenses ground in the stories of the complex histories of gender and race in the constructions of modern science" (p. 8). We must always consider what cultural productions are enabled or restricted (or disabled) by scientific practice, as well as how these cultural productions inscribe on scientific studies of race, class, and gender varying subjectivities and varying relations of power.

Analyses of the dominant concepts of psychological theory and method accommodate the workings of a particular social order, one manifests in the partial views liberal, individualism, and capitalism (Guthman, 1990; Danziger, 1995; Gribbin, 1981; Harris, 1984; Sampson, 1978). Thus, for instance, contemporary conceptualizations of cognition reaffirm notions of autonomous individuals and obscure the problems of economics and social structure by emphasizing mental conditions over material ones (Sampson, 1981). The relation between psychological concepts and politics is not one way. Critical inquiry has shown how epistemology and methodology in social science also govern cultural conditions in such a way as to streamline diversity into a uniform cultural production of presupposed universal consequence. As Rose (1990) wrote, "psychological knowledge and techniques... forge new alignments between the rationales and techniques of power and the values and ethics of democratic societies" (p. 4). It is in the light of such an interactive and culturally specific production that an understanding begins to emerge of the psychological concept of gender as systematically interlocked with racism, classism, and sexism (hooks, 1990). Class, race, gender, and ethnicity are thus socially constructed markers of already-marked psychological consequence as much as they are psychologically constructed markers of marked social consequence. Either way, they signify existing relations of power.

These critical inquiries must delve below the surface features of exclusions or inclusions and go beyond mere attempts to reconceptualize or correct biases in what are often taken to be otherwise worthy empirical
enterprises. Feminist and nonfeminist critics alike take psychology's treatment of race, gender, class, and ethnicity to be a much more epistemologically entrenched and complicated affair. For example, from early psychological research on mental traits to the subsequent research on prejudice and discrimination and, later, to research on race or ethnic relations, it has been shown that empiricism, contrary to claims of objective knowledge making, has never been situated outside of political or social influence (SANNEL, 1978). In another case, a trend analysis of developmental research on African American children found the research to be sensitive to various social movements of different historical moments. However, at the same time, that research was found to be insensitive to how psychology's reifying paradigm set up the preconditions for comparative studies in which the standard ideal remains White and middle class. Without critical reflection, the research also has promoted "person-blame interpretations of social problems" (McLOYD & RANDOLPH, 1990, p. 91). These cases indicate that sensitivity toward or mere inclusion of underrepresented social groups does not guarantee the eradication of bias, social myths, or hierarchical assumptions. Based on an individual-society dichotomy (which itself is filtered through the entrenched workings of liberalism, individualism, and capitalism), psychological theory and practice allows "even radical analyses to be pressed into the service of existing social relations, thereby reinforcing and perpetuating them" (HENRIQUES, 1984, p. 60). Thus, social psychological studies, intended to replace sexist and racist biological theories, remain anchored to constraining or otherwise problematic assumptions. For instance, social psychological theorists have tended to first identify racial or ethnic relations in terms of problems (e.g., prejudice and discrimination) and then to locate their causes in the irrational thought (or cognitions) of an individual. By reducing analysis of the social to the level of the individual, psychological theory joins cognitive psychology in the erosion of social relations and material conditions (HENRIQUES, 1984; LOPES, 1991; SAMPSON, 1991).

A similar case can be made for research on sex and gender. Initial research focused on sex and mental traits but was replaced later by a focus on personality traits, social roles, and gender cognitions (schemas). This shift, although signaling a move toward gender as a "social category imposed on a sexed body" (SCOTT, 1986, p. 1056), nevertheless leaves basically undisturbed both psychology's prevailing empirical paradigm with its emphasis on the existence of differences and evaluation (ranking) of those differences. Likewise, remaining even after this shift to gender as a social category are cultural presuppositions about men and women (HARE-MASTIN & MARCEK, 1990; MORAWSKI, 1987; UNGER, 1989). Although attending to ethnicity, class, race, and gender in psychological theory may displace psychology's reliance on White, middle-class norms, such efforts rarely disrupt empiricism's "predispositional structure" of hierarchically organized, foundational, and oppositional categories (BUTLER, 1990a). Rather, the regulatory functions of epistemology and methodology transform these dynamic and fluid social meanings into static, bounded, and foundational social categories. The use of such social categorization then makes them appear to be social givens, to be "natural" rather than "social" constructions.

Two suggested models for more inclusive research elucidate how moves toward inclusive theory, in failing to extend their analyses to the paradigm itself, reach similar theoretical dead-ends. In the first model, identity components and forms of oppression are analyzed additively. This model operates with the assumptions that race and class and gender functions independently of one another and that their separate or distinct effects can be combined through addition (or separated through subtraction). The attempt to add diverse components of identity and oppression, however, often functions to erase from view the very women it purportedly seeks to emulate. With such an additive model, "proposals to include 'different' viewpoints amount to keeping race and class peripheral to feminist inquiry even while seeming to attend to them." (SPETMAN, 1988, p. 167). That is, non-White and non-middle-class women are simply added to preexisting theories. One result of this building-block approach to studying cultural diversity is that the all-too-often White, middle-class norms are left intact. In this theory revision, psychological phenomena are presumed to be context free rather than context dependent. A second consequence of this approach is that of treating race, class, and sexual orientation as additive qualities of oppression. The assumption here is that the same psychological phenomena vary only by degree for women of different social groups. In other words, endeavors to make visible and to include in theory those people previously made invisible and excluded may be founded on spurious premises when we do not centrally locate, race, class, and gender in our feminist theories. For example, most studies of women and eating disorders have relied on young, White, and middle-class norms. When Black women are studied, which has been rarely the case, they are compared to this norm, and conclusions are drawn about how their race "buffers" them from the American cultural ideal of hypervolender women. By contrast, research focusing on African American and Jamaican women has revealed that they do not see their race as protecting them from such cultural ideals of female bodies. Instead, they use different strategies both to negotiate the meanings of multiple (sometimes opposing) body-image ideals and to regulate their body size (OBACHINA & BAYER, 1994). Here, we can see how stepping outside of comparative analyses leads to a much different understanding of Black women and their bodies and may suggest ways to rethink how questions about body-image and eating disorders are studied.

In the second model, various components of gender, race, and class are combined interactively or multiplicatively; that model is structured to compare Black, middle-, and lower-class women with White middle- and
lower-class women (e.g., Reid & Comas-Diaz, 1990; Smith & Stewart, 1983). Although this approach seems to offer a theoretical improvement over the additive model, it renders such social groupings essential and fixed. Black, middle-class, heterosexual women, for example, become almost a unitary class, and the approach produces a durable and singular understanding of all women fitting that description. Furthermore, such multiplicative identities pose the possibility of infinite forms (i.e., factoring in other categories such as religion or health status or whatever suggests the need to create a new class). Multiplying and mixing social categories, in the end, sows the seeds of its own destruction, for “if the analyses were taken far enough, even these names would begin to show the ragged edges for their own limits are unitary determinations” (Spivak, 1987, p. 114). The dialectic of determinate and indeterminate relations at the intersections of race, gender, and class are turned into static, definitive, and fixed boundaries. In so doing, relations are made into objects and variables, ever more amenable to dissection. When race, class, and gender are objected in this way, psychological theory denies ways in which they enter “into the research process itself—into the selection of a problem, into the methodology . . . and into the relationship with those we are researching” (Edwards, 1990, p. 462). Psychological theory and method alike thus work together to flatten and to homogenize both the innumerable dimensions of gender, race, and class, and the relations among them. It returns researchers to an ironic homogeneity of heterogeneous types. The kind of self or subjectivity that this approach constructs is (despite its multiple determinations) no less individualistic or essentialist than that found in nonintegrative theories.

Neither model helps to counter or rework those social relations that have served as the standard or normative order in psychological theory and research. Indeed, it can be argued that such adjustments to psychology’s prevailing logical empiricist paradigm may, contrary to a researcher’s intention, simply underscore the centrality of a White, middle-class psychology (Zinn, Cameron, Hagnelotham, & Dill, 1986). By keeping this social group as its core, “other” social groups continue to be relegated to the periphery of theory and research or to be treated as a “special case.” One can see, then, how the underlying assumptions of psychology’s positivist paradigm, in both the additive or multiplicative-interactive models, function to perpetuate the status quo. That is, “Whiteness” is not only left unexamined, but its centrality is now maintained by the inclusion of non-White, non-middle-class women. Two main problems follow from these kinds of limited alterations to psychology’s traditional paradigm. First, the seemingly monolithic politics of the paradigm place such diverse representations at the margins or periphery before they are even brought into an epistemological discourse. The paradigm thereby reinterprets the central position of White, middle-class representations (e.g., Gordon, 1985; King, 1988). Being brought into a discourse from the outset signals a marginality that functions to keep the center central. Second, questions about Whiteness and about the presumed centrality of this social category are often ignored. That is, the meaning of being White, middle-class, and heterosexual, and of the privileges that come with this social position are left unproblematic and unexamined (see Franklin, 1993). Predetermined perceptions of selves as marginal, as “other,” leave uninterrogated the center—traditionally White ethnicity—and thereby “redoubles” its hegemony “by naturalizing it” (hooks, 1992, p. 171; see also Christian, 1989b). The theoretical work to be done, then, involves a deconstruction of what researchers have for so long constructed as the “center,” in addition to re-fashioning central theoretical constructions. This does not mean that we simply replace the center with what it constitutes as marginal, but, as Spivak (1987) argued, that we seek to displace the center through the agency of positioning themselves within it and making knowable the center’s marginal politics. Such a move requires that we accept “theory” as comprising cultural histories and theoretical stability as an interest in reproducing those same cultural histories (Spivak, 1987). As Butler (1990a) stated, this is problematic: “The question is not: what meaning does that inscription carry within it, but what cultural apparatus arranges this meeting between instrument and body, what interventions into this ritualistic repetition are possible?” (p. 146).

In combination, these feminist critiques present for-challenging challenges to theory making, ones that can be usefully extended to psychology. As we have attempted to point out in our discussion of the additive or interactive approaches to making theory and research culturally diverse, psychologists’ tools of knowledge production can never be assumed to be politically neutral. Rather, they must be scrutinized for ways in which they function to reproduce hierarchical social relations among women of differing races, classes, ethnicities, and sexual orientation. We must also see how our traditional approaches direct us toward individual-centered psychological theories instead of toward the historical, social, and cultural contingencies of psychological phenomena, as well as ways of seeing and thinking about our everyday lives. Similarly, psychologists’ routine investigative practices need be examined for how our theorizing, research designs, questions, and writing style impose limitations on a multicultural psychology. We must consider how these “tools of the trade” can render the inclusion of forgotten and ignored “others,” of voices silenced by assumptions of a universal psychological subject and subjectivity. We need to move back several steps to ask ourselves about the very categories of race, class, ethnicity, and sexual orientation that we take to be “natural” given rather than cultural constructions. Similarly, it seems that we need to confront our equation of these social categories with cultural reality and of multiple categories with cultural diversity. Unraveling the meanings of these cate-
gories therefore is as key to culturally diverse psychological theories as is an examination of how conventional uses of these categories might function to preserve rather than alter dominant-subordinant-type relations that are based on race, class, gender, ethnicity, and sexual relations. Taking cultural diversity seriously, then, will mean that psychologists must undertake theory making with difficult questions.

With full recognition that the difficulties and troubles that accompany any effort to revise or re-create the ways and means of culturally diverse psychological theories will not be remedied completely by a single theoretical swoop, we offer what we take to be crucial considerations for a revision of theory making. The most basic of these considerations, and the one from which the others follow, is that of changing our view of theory itself. Contrary to seeing theory as the glue that holds scientific variables together in some meaningful way or as the logic behind scientific hypothesis, we suggest that theory be understood as practice (and science as the practice of theory and knowledge making). By shifting to a view of theory as practice, the theory becomes characterized by action and reflection that is situated culturally and historically. As a result, when psychologists produce theory, they simultaneously create possibilities for selves, relations, and social actions.

Yet, the practice is performe of a double nature: at the same time that it is to direct the ways of theory making, it must also intervene in those established and disciplined practices of psychological theory. It must, in all senses, break ground. Butler (1990a), in her writing on gender and sexuality, envisioned strategic intervention as "parodic practices in which the original, the authentic, and the real are themselves constituted as effects" (p. 146). That is, she posited intervention that "mourn[ed] and reconsolidate[ed] the very distinction between a privileged and naturalized ... configuration and one that appears as derived, phantasmatic, and mimetic—a failed copy, as it were" (Butler, 1990a, p. 146). This means, as Butler suggested, that constructions of "fundamental locales" of identity are shown to be "uninhabitable" and therefore are observed as "political structures" (Butler, 1990a, 146–147). Following Butler's ideas, one might envision practice as a "practice of habitable locales." That is, our practice might well begin with the lived conditions of race, gender, class, and ethnicity (cf. hooks, 1990), with how our social relations, in many ways, structure their locales of identity, be they habitable or uninhabitable. Taking theory as practice and grounding this practice in the everyday world of social relations and psychological experiences is all part of making knowledge situate.

Although feminism in psychology has taken a first step toward such a view (with its emphasis on gender as a process of social interaction and not just an attribute, role, or ascribed quality), many feminist theories do not regard this move as commensurate with theoretical diversity. Two examples illustrate how new theoretical understandings follow from situating knowledge within the context of social-cultural relations. Viewing oppression and subordination as arising not from attributes or traits but from disparate histories of social relations, Hurtado (1989), for example, analyzed the relationship between White women and Women of Color, including its conflict and tension, within the framework of their dissimilar historical relations to White men. Directing her attention to different forms of oppression rather than degrees of oppression, Hurtado elucidated White women's oppression in terms of subordination through "seduction" and Women of Color's oppression in terms of subordination through "rejection." Class is seen as mediating the "rewards of seduction" and the "sanctions of rejection" (Hurtado, 1989, p. 844). Hurtado's analysis disrupts a number of traditional fronts in psychology. Gender identity becomes understood as a historical construction of diverse and variable social relations, even though it remains "the marking mechanism through which subordination...is maintained" (Hurtado, 1989, p. 145). Dichotomized categories, such as public-private, visibility-invisibility, and silence-speech, simply do not hold up under the analytic weight of diverse histories of social relations. Also, once the dichotomies are dissolved, assumptions of universal, transhistorical, and abstract categories also begin to crumble, for they are constructed with and sustained through these bipolar categories.

These elaborations of the intricate relations among gender, ethnicity, and class were also made evident by Prell (1990). Her social and historical analysis of Jewish stereotypes showed how multifaceted understandings can spring forth when researchers break away from studies of differences between bounded categories. In looking at stereotypes for the Jewish mother ("selfless giver") and "Jewish American princess" (self-focused consumer), Prell located the social origin of these stereotypes not in relations between women but in relations between Jewish men and American culture, which are then projected onto women. Stereotypes of Jewish women thus symbolize "the conflicts experienced by Jewish men as they negotiate their difference from and continuity with American culture" (Prell, 1990, p. 249). These stereotypes represent, as Prell noted, symbolic expressions of Jewish men's wishes and fears. Although Prell did extend her analysis far enough to take into account the production of the particular symbolic expressions, her approach of "reading" culture reveals the embeddedness of cultural constructions (Jewish) within other cultural constructions (American). Relations among ethnicity, class, and gender are thus shown to be a diverse complex of multiple, ongoing cultural histories.

Both of these studies demonstrate the possibility of moving beyond the staid and stymied places of theory making to cultural and historical sites of action and agency, where there are many diverse social and cultural relations. They also illustrate the theoretical benefits to be derived from pressing beyond simple and fixed social categories. In these cases, identity becomes re-fashioned as the result of complex social relations that are al-
ways undergoing revision in historically and culturally meaningful ways. Within these new theoretical sites, locales are diversified across, within, and without race, gender, ethnicity, and class. Within these locales, diversity prevails in historical, shifting, and dynamic meanings. Simple social-cultural categories of identity, social relations, or both are replaced by an elaboration of their interconnectedness. The hollowness of simple social-cultural categories of identity, social relations, or both is thereby made evident. Making theory in this way thus at once intervenes in psychology’s conventional individual-centered theories and in ahistorical treatment of social relations.

Having stirred a few troubles with traditional conceptualizations of race, class, gender, culture, and diversity, we turn now to the terrain on which these troubles arise: social science at the boundaries of theory, method, and social relations. Our purpose here is to extend the ideas of theory as practice and knowledge as situated by exploring the social relations and practices of doing scientific work. This means that we examine how psychologists are inevitably a part of knowledge-making endeavors and how knowledge producers and the tools they use also need to be understood in historical and cultural terms.

DISTURBING BOUNDARIES IN THE SCIENCES

A dissection of problematic categories in psychology is not possible without deeper reflection on epistemological matters, on beliefs about the form and acquisition of valid knowledge. In fact, the predominant approach of feminist psychologists—that of adopting an empiricist epistemology—eventually raised several crucial questions about empiricism. Feminist-empiricist psychologists initially located sexist practices not in epistemology (i.e., in the theories of knowledge) but in methodology, and they believed that the construction of nonsexist science required simply that bias be eliminated from empirical methods. Yet, in correcting these biases, feminist empiricists actually transgressed the epistemic boundaries of empiricism. For instance, in suggesting that sound (nonsexist) science would result from including more women in the scientific community, they violated the empiricist tenet that attributes of the observer are irrelevant to objective observation. Also, in occasionally admitting that science mirrors human values (in this case, sexist values), they compromised the empiricist conception of an objective fact that stands apart from any value. Finally, in describing science as a self-contained rule system, feminist empiricists overlooked the unfortunate fact that conforming to conventional methods, however sanitized of an-
the solution to generating feminist theory. Despite the rejection of grand theory and metanarratives, these philosophies have tended to preserve certain essential premises about epistemology that, for instance, emphasize master theories and undervalue concrete or lived experiences (Fraser & Nicholson, 1990; Skinner, 1985). More specifically, postmodern work tends to reproduce the transcendent and rational theorizer while constructing the "other" as partial and fractured (Harstock, 1990). Such tendencies raise questions: Should those who remain outside positions of power not be suspicious of this epistemological move? Or, as Harstock (1990) asked,

Why is it that just at the moment when so many of us who have been silenced begin to demand the right to name ourselves, to act as subjects rather than objects of history, then just then the concept of subjectivity becomes problematic? Just when we are forming our own theories about the world, uncertainty emerges about whether the world can be theorized. (pp. 163-164; see also Christian, 1989b)

Postmodernism falters on another account: It fails to recognize the relatively stable macrostructures of power in society. Postmodern theorizing cannot accommodate the dominant axes that straitify power according to gender, race, and class. Systematic forms of social power are denied by postmodern theorists such as Foucault. Just as postmodernism denies or overlooks these social arrangements, it provides no legitimate means to envision an alternative social order. These conditions led Latour (1991) to define postmodernism as "a disappointed form of modernism. It shares with its enemy all its features but hope." (p. 17). The postmodern option, then, can lead feminist theorizing to yet another dead-end. And it will do so as long as feminist theorists construe their epistemological choices in simple or binary oppositions and thus remain "imprisoned by the alternatives imposed by Enlightenment thought and postmodernism," which insist that "either one must adopt the perspective of the transcendental and disembodied voice of ‘reason’ or one must abandon the goal of accurate and systematic knowledge of the world." (Harstock, 1987, p. 17).

Other choices do remain possible, especially if feminists acknowledge the social, and thus socially strategic, nature of knowledge production, and if they remain vigilant about the inevitable consequences of continuing to adhere to oppositional and binary systems of knowledge (Addlesee, 1983). A fuller array of choices emerges once we abandon the old schemas about the form and function of knowledge, particularly scientific knowledge. One set of alternative choices is emerging from recent work in social studies of science. Over the past two decades, the field of science studies has shown how science as practiced is remarkably different from science as recorded: These studies have demonstrated that what scientists do in their everyday activities is not what is recorded in either conventional scientific texts, histories of science, or philosophical models. In other words, "the whole edifice of epistemology, all the clichés about scientific method, about what it is to be a scientist, the paraphernalia of Science, was constructed out of science-made, out of science past, never out of science in the making, science now" (Latour, 1991, p. 7). Such illustrated distinctions between mythic science and science as actually practiced open the way for rethinking those very practices. In particular, they open the way for reconsidering how science is made and, in turn, makes the world.

Taken together, the critical unpacking of theoretical categories, feminist objectives for new knowledge and politics, critical writings by members of oppressed groups, and radically different understandings of science multiply and transform the possibilities for theoretical action. Taken together, these movements demand that all boundaries, from the old demarcations between what is taken to be nature and culture to those between purportedly contesting epistemologies, need to be reconsidered. Taken together, these movements are essentially renegotiations of knowledge making that are at once transgressive, radical, and utopian. Although the specifics of such renegotiations cannot be fully spelled out here, some sense of the project can be conveyed through examples of such boundary reworking. For example, Haraway (1985) framed some of these possibilities in the form of a manifesto that links science studies, Marxist studies, and feminism. She invoked the image of a cyborg, an entity that is half human and half machine, to describe the dissolution of boundaries between machine and organism, human and animal, imagination and material reality, and physical and nonphysical entities. The boundary transgressions and "potent fusions" symbolically embodied in the cyborg myth help one to see not only how progressive intellects themselves remain caught in dualist thinking (especially when that thinking is about science and technology), but also how other visions of the world are possible. Although a cyborg world elicits immediate thoughts about the ultimate dangers of political domination and technological determinism, it also affords the opportunity to think creatively: "From another perspective, a cyborg world might be about lived social and bodily realities in which people are not afraid of their joint kinship with animals and machines, not afraid of permanently partial identities and contradictory standpoints" (Haraway, 1985, p. 72).

Another locus of boundary reworking occurring in science studies also has implications ranging far beyond science. Woolgar (1988b) identified several crucial boundaries produced through and sustained by scientific practices. These established and honored divides are neither stable nor certain and, for that reason, some of them constitute "methodological horrors" for scientists. For instance, presumed dualism of "representation" and the "object" to be represented raise horrors about the relation between the two. Although in science it is presupposed that objects in the world ultimately determine the (scientific) representations of those objects, in ac-
tuality representations can influence those very objects— their form, properties, and dynamics. Yet, to acknowledge this mutuality between objects in the world and representations of them threatens the conventional understanding of science itself. Scientists routinely seek not to acknowledge these multivalent dynamics but to cover over or manage them; in analyzing these management strategies, science studies researchers have unsealed another presumed boundary: the demarcation between science and all other human activities. The findings from science studies suggest that science proceeds with the same human resources and skills as do nonscientific activities. These studies suggest “that there is no essential difference between science and other forms of knowledge production; that there is nothing intrinsically special about ‘the scientific method’” (Woolgar, 1988b, p. 12).

Dismantling the boundaries of science and nonscience, the demarcations between science and other everyday practices, has substantial implications for making theory, scientific claims, social policy, and politics. However, this particular boundary dissolution has even more radical implications because it reveals yet more obdurate dualisms that sustain science and nonscience alike. For example, Latour (1991) identified a historically constituted divide between what is taken to be “human” and “nonhuman.” Originating in the 17th century, the dichotomy between human (with political representation) and nonhuman (with scientific representation) has been rewritten a “political constitution of truth” that is more inclusive than a political constitution as it is conventionally understood, because the former deals with both human and nonhuman representation. A political constitution of truth “also distributes powers, will, rights to speak, and checks and balances. It decides on the crucial distribution of competences; for instance, matter has or does not have will; God speaks only to the heart and not of politics” (Latour, 1991, p. 13). Divisions between human/nonhuman, political–scientific, and social–natural serve the creation of “two separate parliaments, one hidden for things, the other open for citizens” (Latour, 1991, p. 15). A related divide in this political world also concerns agency; in this case the agents of representation “which mediate the world and its representations” (Woolgar, 1988b, p. 101). That is, Woolgar located in scientific practice a moral order that sustains representation; in this moral order, agents (scientists) are considered passive in the sense that they are thought to be incapable of affecting the form of the world, yet they are considered active in that they are understood as responsible for the representations they furnish. This drama of moral responsibility is difficult to see because agency is complex and obscured in scientific practice. For Woolgar (1988b), the task was even more challenging because it “is not just to understand the moral order which sustains the ideology of representation, but to seek ways of changing it” (p. 105).

The reworking of such boundaries through science studies has parallels in feminist studies, particularly in the work of Women of Color. For example, Dill (1987) identified several conventional markers that structure conventional research on Black women, including the oppositional play between concepts of femininity and Black women, class and culture, and autonomy and caring. Beyond these operational, oppositional confusions that recur in the research, Black women who engage in intellectual activities confront additional problems. Collins (1989) indicated how Black feminist theorists are expected to subscribe to a hegemonic epistemology that designates their identity as Black women. By recovering this identity in its historical specificity, Collins explored an alternative epistemological framework, one that disdoses the boundaries between self and knowledge production and between experience and what is taken to be a valid representation of that experience. From another perspective, Christian (1989a) opposed the “race for theory” because of its reinvention of an authoritative monolithism that excludes Women of Color; she called for reflexive work that would place Women of Color as subjects and agents of inquiry. By refusing the problematic boundaries between agent and representation, however reframed in contemporary theorizing, Christian (1989a) forced hard questions to be asked: “To whom are we accountable? And what social relations are inscribing us?” (p. 74).

PRACTICING POSSIBILITIES: IDENTITY, REFLEXIVITY, AND AFFINITY

The impasses in (feminist) empiricism, and the paradoxes that abound in feminist theorizing generally, complicate developing a culturally diverse psychological theory. The recent history of North American feminism records recurring, troubling divides. Although some feminists have called for a final resolution of these political and theoretical schisms (Alcoff, 1988), others have suggested that such a resolution is either impossible or undesirable (Stittow, 1990). Given the problems and possibilities recalled in this chapter, we stand among the latter group of feminist thinkers. We hold that no simple correction will mend the problems, but that unresolved tensions can be a generative force of unknown potential for strategic action. They can stimulate the reconceptualization of identity, social relations, and activism as they constitute the processes and products of knowledge making. In particular, they enable reconceptualizations that take gender, race, and class to be located in the social relations of knowledge making as well as in the social relations of other lived experiences. Feminists must make these new configurations with clear recognition of their dual ambitions in continuing “an anti-sexist project, which involves chal-
lenging and deconstructing phallocentric discourses; and in a positive pro-
ject of constructing and developing alternative models, methods, procedures, discourses, etc.” (Cross, 1986, p. 195).

Reconfiguring identity, social relations, and activist accomplishments, then, form “not a true discourse, nor a mere objective or scientific account. It could be appropriately seen, rather, as a strategy, a local, specific intervention with definite political, even if provisional aims and goals” (Cross, 1986, p. 196). This revising involves destabilizing and shifting the narrative field of conventional knowledge, rather than inventing an entirely different narrative (Haraway, 1980). It requires nothing more or less than working locally and tactically to name and reshape identities, social relations, and intellectual practices. Above all, it demands awareness of one’s engagement in the project. That is, whenever feminists introduce their identity (their subjectivity), they interrupt the taken-for-granted separations between the object and subject of knowledge. Whenever feminists make subjectivity the focus of their inquiry, they further tamper with the normative order of constructing truth. And whenever feminists suggest that identity (of observers and the observed alike) involves fictions, concealments, and multiplicities, they really make trouble (Briddori, 1986; Butler, 1990b).

In each of these instances, self-awareness or reflexivity is acknowledged.

In the construction of new theory, reflexivity becomes significant not only as a general property of all theory (i.e., theories are always reflexive either in intentional or inadvertent forms) but also as central to the very process of theory building. That is, ceasing to take identity (subjectivity) for granted goes well beyond mere explication of the analyst’s personal values. Simple efforts at value clarification or the naming of certain attributes of the analyst-scientist, in the end, is even confronting reflexivity. Those efforts either assume that there is some simple correspondence between intellectual discourse and its producer (i.e., feminist texts are related to female authors, sexist texts to male authors) or pretend that any correspondence between discourse and producers can be eliminated (by proclaiming feminist values, the author thereby becomes more objective). Such remedial strategies, reliant as they are on common sense and stereotypes, merely expose superficial features of identity and its relation to scientific representations. The irony in this is that these same superficial features may serve to restrain further exploration because with them comes the belief that some meaningful semblance of reflexivity has been realized.

Taking subjectivity more seriously means taking reflexivity more seriously. Reflexivity is most generally defined as “a turning back on oneself, a form of self-awareness” (Lawson, 1985, p. 9). Reflexivity is the self-referential character of theory and “an aspect of all social science, since any statement which holds that humans act or believe in particular ways under particular circumstances refers as much to the social scientist as to anyone else” (Gruenberg, 1978, p. 322). Viewed from a larger perspective, reflexivity concerns the very relations between object (reality) and agents’ representations (observers’ accounts of reality); it refers to that back-and-forth process whereby making sense of an account of reality depends on preexisting knowledge of what that account refers to and vice versa (Ashmore, 1989; Woolgar, 1988a). Thus, reflexivity undermines the assumed independence of representation and object (that was discussed earlier) because “the character of representation, as perceived by the actor, changes to accommodate the perceived nature of underlying reality and the latter simultaneously changes to accommodate the former” (Woolgar, 1988b, p. 33).

Once this broader presence of reflexivity is acknowledged, the awareness of analyst and the awareness of object are seen to be bound together. Self-regard and other-regard are interdependent. With these acknowledgments, we return to Christian’s (1989a) question: “To whom are we accountable? And what social relations are inscribing us?” (p. 74). Feminists also can join Woolgar in the task of discovering (and redifining) the moral order of the self that exists in the constitution of truth statements. And as Snitow (1990) suggested, each of these undertakings requires “an internal as well as external struggle about goals and tactics” (p. 29). In summary, reflexivity concerns the analyst’s lived relations in a collective enterprise, locating agency and moral responsibility, and continual attention to the shifting social and moral order of representation.

Two experiments illustrate the task of reflexive work and the unstable relations of self-regard and other-regard that must be examined in theory construction and research. Linden (1990) conducted an ethnographic study of Holocaust survivors in which she, the analyst, was reflexively positioned within the study (and within the final written account). Linden (1990) challenged ethographic dualisms of subject and object, self and other, and historically specific events and transhistorical knowledge “by inscribing myself in the text, as a partner in dialogue or as an active commentator on ‘narrative discourses’” (p. 6). Linden wrote her account of survivors’ accounts of their lives with her changing MANUSCRIPTS OF THOSE ACCOUNTS OVER THE YEARS. The weaving was not of disparate strands, for Linden attended to the mutual interdependence of tellers and creators of accounts. In particular, Linden (1990) reflected on her earlier bewilderment over one of her interviewee’s decision to join the resistance and thus further risk her life during the war years:

The limitations of my lived experience—and hence, of my imagination—are reflected in the fact that I didn’t understand the force of her words, and perhaps I still do not. Now as I read my interpretation of her decision to join the underground, my own hypostatized meanings...
of resistance are reflected back to me. I feel as though I am already into a mirror at my own image. (p. 17)

Linden revealed how ethnographic subjects are constructed through multiple levels of social relations, varied positions of self and other, and inscription techniques that are structured by culture and historical resources, including language and epistemic rules. Her intersubjective writing also indicated the indexicality of representation—the continual shifts in meaning and interpretation over time. These interpretive shifts are dependent on the interlocutor and her relation to the participants as they are on the participant's particular framework.

A second experiment dealt with the textual interplay of other-regard and self-regard in psychological articles. Moranowski and Steele (1991) examined a selection of psychological writings for the implicit construal of femininity and masculinity that was assumed to be given in these writings. Most of the texts that were sampled contained representations of males as self, agent, analyst, masterful, rational, and female as other, subject, dependent, and bad. However, in the feminist psychological writings, these dichotomies of self-other, agent-subject were fractured, and multiple selves were empowered in different social relations. While demonstrating an inadvertent form of reflexive practice, however, Moranowski and Steele resisted reflexivity. In depicting pervasive cultural relations of power (in this case, gender relations) help sustain scientific discourse, Moranowski and Steele actually relied on conventions of scientific discourse. Not only did the study depend on the traditional structure of theoretical debate in psychology (between contesting opposing positions, between the masculine and feminine), but it maintained the personae of the passive analyst: "We have written of others and disclosed little of ourselves, and rarely been in doubt. Like the good experiment, we have kept our distance and avoided personal involvement" (Moranowski & Steele, 1991, p. 128). Like good experimenters, Moranowski and Steele also took responsibility for their representations, but not for the character of the world (Woodger, 1988b).

Although the authors acknowledged the fragility of their textual representations, they pushed the exploration of reflexivity no further. Their selves and their world remained in a safety box. Had the authors gone further, had they pursued additional reflexive work, they might have gone beyond exposing their own dependence on discursive practices. They also might have confronted their reluctance either to transgress these discursive practices or to examine more closely the political and moral axes on which these practices are structured. Such confrontations might have meant getting experimental in the truest sense of the word, that is, it might have meant writing in an unorthodox way (e.g., use of poems, pictures, fiction).

in trying to enter personally into this discourse to turn theory back on itself, I, Betty, find myself confronted with specific questions about practicing reflexivity that are making a little trouble of their own. For example, by placing my personal reckoning at the conclusion of our chapter, is it therefore an afterthought, an epilogue to the main text? And, if so, does this mean that the main text is depersonalized (cf. Miller, 1991)? Do I signal either my central or my marginal relation to the main text by having some final personal say? By positioning responsive writing at the end, have their own relationship). In the end, however, these alternative practices might have meant not getting published.

Inclusive psychological theory will require investigation of the social relations that enable subject and object, self and other, and object and representation. It will require much different experiments with identity and reflexivity, perhaps even many false starts and failed attempts. Our successes, however, probably will be readily identifiable more by successive changes to the way we write and think about identity than by some absolute measure of the goodness of our reflexive efforts. To say this, however, does not assuage us of our own reflexive responsibility in the writing of this chapter. Our conclusions can serve as a practice field for exploring these responsibilities.

Conclusion 1

How, then, do we reflexively locate ourselves in the proposals we offer of feminist strategies toward realizing culturally diverse, psychological theory? We envision our reflexive efforts through Haraway's (1985) idea of affinity projects or groups ("related not by blood but by choice, the appeal of one chemical nuclear group for another, avidity," p. 72). Although our work is in the local context of knowledge production, and our representations are shaped by our nationalities, and by the local contours of ourselves as feminists, White, women, academics, mothers, and colleagues, our affinity project as a "response through coalition, not identity" (p. 73) seeks to subvert or alter our own partial locations. We share an affinity with those who endeavor to disrupt the hegemonic hold of science as traditionally practiced and hence to change the political conditions that structure our social relations. To accomplish this end, our affinity project has moved along diverse avenues of intellectual thought. Shortcomings and all, we take our work to be an affinity project wherein reflexivity comes to mean, in this case, a mobilizing of agencies to a political end of creating theoretical perturbations.

Conclusion 2

In trying to enter personally into this discourse to turn theory back on itself, I, Betty, find myself confronted with specific questions about practicing reflexivity that are making a little trouble of their own. For example, by placing my personal reckoning at the conclusion of our chapter, is it therefore an afterthought, an epilogue to the main text? And, if so, does this mean that the main text is depersonalized (cf. Miller, 1991)? Do I signal either my central or my marginal relation to the main text by having some final personal say? By positioning responsive writing at the end, have
I paradoxically donned the robes of traditional discourse in my efforts to shed them. Does my language of “center” or “margin” perpetrate or resist tradition? And, do these personal disclosures reflexively involve theory or do they just exist alongside theory work?

For me, personal appraisal, as one form of reflexive practice, not only raises those questions, but it also presents me with a bit of conundrum. Whatever I choose to include, disclose, gloss over, or exclude rests with me and my demands of myself as one of the authors (and not from readers or authors whose texts I have drawn on). To acknowledge such conditions is to realize that reflexive practice is also about the personal responsibility I assume in writing these words, in fashioning my relationship to theory, and especially my relationship to culturally diverse theoretical work. Reflexive practice involves, but is not limited to, the relations between me and theory, between my personal authorial voice and theory’s authorial voice. Miller (1991) called this the “double challenge” (i.e., the problem of “recontextualizing the subject’s relation to itself and to authority, the authority in theory” (p. 213). But this challenge prompts an additional consideration: To whom am I writing these personal words? To Jill? To the theorists in this chapter? To readers? To myself? To everyone?

One way to look at these relations is by examining what is concealed and what revealed when I adopt the traditional discursive practice of theory making. Such an authorial voice, for example, serves not only to distance me from the theories I discuss but also to conceal my very work of selecting, interpreting, and positioning the theories I have drawn on. That voice conveys nothing about the relation between me and these theories because I have not made this relationship known. And, in a curious twist of events, I remain masked by the traditional position assumed by theorists—posing either as a medium through which these texts speak or as a mediator who negotiates the ways and means of making culturally diverse feminism theory (an authorial position whichever way one looks at it). On this front, I have not been as disruptive as I set out to be. While engaged in this process of working out a way to make possible the practice of culturally diverse feminist psychology, I find myself merely sketching the contours of how I seek to be more than a translator, a commentator, or interpreter engage the personal in the practice of theory. For it may be that only through reflexive work on our relations to culturally diverse feminist theories that we will begin to change our social relations of practice, and this would indeed be the most stirring trouble we could introduce to theory making.

Conclusion

One of the troubles less thoroughly stirred than others in this chapter is that of reflexivity: the quandary of the subject’s identity (researcher’s subjectivity) in representations of reality. Reflexivity sometimes proves to be an odd ingredient in a study of culture because it appears to demand emphasis on individual identity in the study of an ostensibly collective phenomena. In this conception, the identity of “we,” the authors, is positioned in a distinctly conventional way; “we” are an authorial third-person plural voice. But that positioning is rent with complications, not the least of which is a problem of the multiple positioning I, Jill, assume: In the third-person collective voice of this chapter’s co-author; in a separate third-person plural voice created with the co-author of another article, Robert Freire; and in my own textual voice referenced by several recent publications.

The matter of positioning these authorial voices is complicated even further if the status of psychology’s literary style is considered, especially its claim to renunciation of the subjective or personal. My multiple voices, although faint sounds against an orchestrated postivist science, in some (perhaps ironic) ways conform to the profession’s constraints on discursive practices. And to complicate matters, my writings also transpose in a culture of feminist scholarship, with its own literary and discursive standards. As Miller (1991) recalled, feminist works of the 1970s “were clearly fueled by taking the personal as a category of thought and gender as category of analysis” (p. 14). However, these initial motivations were followed by a “self-conscious depersonalization” in feminist writings of the 1980s as researchers refined feminist theories and established legitimate lines of inquiry. In other words, my complicated multiple voices conform, in varying degrees, to contemporary disciplinary standards. Despite or perhaps because of such complex layering of authorial voices, and deference to disciplinary styles of writing, our chapter concludes (the first conclusion) with a commitment to affinities, to “coalition, not identity.” By demanding attention to social relations of coalitional affinities, the claim does establish a vantage point for speaking and writing somewhere between the social and the personal. Yet, such a capitulation claim also saves me from fully confronting the multiple collective “we’s” in which my “self” speaks. By displacing my “self” through attention to coalitions, I can proceed with the project of writing about cultural diversity while being a White, professional middle-class, faculty member at an elite university, and so forth. These reflections prompt a question: Does the first conclusion describe viable practices or a form of “passing”? As I contemplate this awkward and difficult question, I am compelled yet again to “get theoretical,” to use that very question as an illustration of how massive is the project of a reflexive psychology—the project of expanding theoretical practices to include the personal. Similarly, I am tempted to add another thoroughly theoretical comment on the multiplicity and fragmentation of identities in contemporary culture. These are not horrendous moves, but however promising, they do push us back into a textual position that evades or dialogues the “personal.” These reflections prompt a second ques-
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