Assessing Psychology's Moral Heritage Through Our Neglected Utopias

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ABSTRACT The increasing interest in the history of psychology has led to recommendations for refining our historical methods and thinking about historical knowledge generally. Solely intellectual or presentist histories obscure many of the problems and insights that were experienced by our forebears and deny contemporary psychologists a broader perspective for viewing current psychological and moral issues. A more critical historical perspective would acknowledge the unexplored facets of psychology's heritage. This study examines earlier proposals for the role of psychology in the betterment of American society, particularly as they were manifested in the utopias of G. Stanley Hall, William McDougall, Hugo Münsterberg, and John B. Watson. The authors' fictional and professional writings include programs for societal improvement that contrast with the image of psychology typically portrayed in conventional histories—that of a science maturing quite independently of societal influences or consequences. Historical investigations that transcend such conventional images contribute not only to a more comprehensive history but also to a more critical understanding of the interplay between psychology and society.

The centennial of experimental psychology in 1979 heightened interest in the discipline's history by offering the psychologist lore about precursors, innovations, controversies, and great achievements. Paralleling these centennial events has been a growing concern with the state of scholarship in the history of psychology, particularly with histories that primarily document or celebrate intellectual milestones. Such studies suggest both the inaccuracy of conventional histories and the incompleteness of the more accurate intellectual histories that represent psychology as an isolated corpus of ideas or an accumulation of scientific discoveries.

Recently historians have begun to reevaluate the conventional history of psychology. For the most part, they have assessed various historical "myths" perpetuated in our histories as well as the inordinate concern with psychology's intellectual heritage and consequent neglect of its social and political context. For instance, Samelson (1974) investigated the "origin myths" that date social psychology's birth with Comte's positive social philosophy. Harris (1979) has shown how the conventional interpretations of John B. Watson's experiment with little Albert relate more to the interpreter's particular theoretical interests than to the actual Albert study. Others have investigated how the expansion and activities of American psychology have been shaped by economic and political events (Camfield, 1969; Finison, 1976; Sokal, 1980). Such studies suggest both the inaccuracy of conventional histories and the incompleteness of the more accurate intellectual histories that represent psychology as an isolated corpus of ideas or an accumulation of scientific discoveries.

Similar reexaminations have been undertaken in the history of science (see Agassi, 1963; Brush, 1974; Teich & Young, 1973). A contribution of these studies that has yet to be appreciated in psychology is an understanding of the broader social relations and moral heritage of science. As one historian of science has noted, abeyance of this heritage "deprives scientists of the present time of a historical perspective on their moral problems, with the result that their illusion of suddenly lost innocence makes their dilemmas seem unprece-
dented and hence worse than they really are” (Ravetz, 1973, p. 210). Conventional or purely intellectual histories of psychology obscure some fundamental issues of the past: the role of psychology and the psychologist in society, the confrontation with ethical problems, the relation of psychology to the humanities and other sciences, and the dissemination of psychological knowledge to the public. Thus, the contemporary psychologist may miss both substantive knowledge about the historical precedence of current social issues and, consequently, the opportunity to assess how these issues have developed relative to theory and epistemology. Furthermore, because more comprehensive and critical studies require scrutiny not merely of dusty texts and journals but also of personal papers, institutional records, unpublished manuscripts, and forgotten publications, they attend to the “human” context in which psychological knowledge is created. Rediscovery of these historical materials may have sobering effects—as with the cases of Cyril Burt and J. B. Watson (Samelson, 1980)—yet there is no reason why such excursions cannot have positive consequences as well.

There are several reasons why the conventional histories of psychology have charted a practically unidimensional course of psychology’s advance. Psychology, after all, is a relatively new discipline seeking recognition as a natural science. Histories detailing the discovery of theories and refinement of methods have confirmed its scientific image (Hagstrom, 1965; O’Donnell, 1979). They reified the hopes to establish a true science of the mind, sometimes nearly succumbing to what has been called “physics envy.” There is perhaps a more specific reason why conventional histories have not directly addressed social, moral, or political issues of the past. Scientists have long subscribed to discordant moral attitudes. These have been described by Toulmin (1975) as a “Baconian” morality, where science serves as an instrument committed to human improvement, and a “Newtonian” morality, where science serves the rational pursuit of a true understanding of nature. Scientists have adhered to the Baconian image principally in the external affairs of science and have done so to secure the societal support necessary to pursue intellectual interests. For instance, after World War I, the National Academy of Sciences adopted such Baconian arguments in order to retain public support for scientific research (Tobey, 1971). The Newtonian image has guided the internal workings of science, its organization and operations. It also has predominated in psychological textbooks and various other mandates affirming that psychologists “can be most useful to society by staying in their laboratories and libraries, there to remain until they can come forth with reliable predictions and well-tested applications” (Pratt, 1939, p. 179).

It is with this attitude that conventional or intellectual histories of social psychology would cite F. H. Allport’s (1924) Social Psychology as a seminal contribution to the field but would make no mention of his substantial proposals about applying social psychology to ensure a democratic, egalitarian, and controlled society.

This article addresses one unexplored event in psychology’s heritage. It treats several victims of a historical perspective that is imbued with a Newtonian image of the science: four utopias published between 1915 and 1930 by the hardly obscure psychologists G. Stanley Hall, William McDougall, Hugo Münsterberg, and John B. Watson. These utopias clearly reflect Baconian thinking, not in a simple resemblance to New Atlantis, but in their dedication to explaining how psychology, as a science, is instrumental to human welfare. For this reason alone, the utopias would have no place in conventional histories. However, the utopias and other writings of the four psychologists also belie a clear distinction between the Baconian and Newtonian moralities in psychology. In their epistemological thinking, the four psychologists essentially attempted a unification of psychology as a knowledge system and as a social instrument. Their utopias served to illustrate this unity and, hence, to show the imperative for advancing psychology. The correspondence between their utopian and professional writings affirms their dedication to these ideas. When viewed in the broader context of the period 1915 to 1930, these writings cannot be interpreted simply as anomalies, as peculiar pastimes of professionals, but must be seen as plausible answers to perceived crises both in academic psychology and in American society. When viewed in relation to contemporary psychology, the writings intimate a continued reluctance to confront such dual moralities.

G. Stanley Hall and the Ideal Community

G. Stanley Hall generally has been applauded for his strategic role in American experimental psychology: He organized the first psychological journal, the first American psychological association, the first Wundtian laboratory in America, and the first and only American visit of Freud. In addition
to enumerating these accomplishments, most histories acknowledge that Hall also was a versatile psychologist who promoted genetic psychology and related evolutionary concepts, an interest in psychoanalysis, and the design of questionnaires (e.g., Boring, 1950; R. I. Watson, 1971). Except for a biography (Ross, 1972), these histories do not examine Hall’s comprehensive view of evolution, the philosophical assumptions of his theories, and his prescriptions for resolving social problems.

Written late in Hall’s career, “The Fall of Atlantis” (1920a) tells of a utopian civilization. The story purportedly is narrated by a cultural anthropologist who visited Atlantis’ remains in 2000 A.D. and learned that it had at one time governed the civilized world with a culture that far exceeded any contemporary vision of progress. Atlantis represented human evolution toward perfection in every detail: its language was the most flexible expression of the human psyche, medicine had excelled to the point of becoming a philosophic science, the political structure integrated all known codes of justice, and education permeated all stages of life.

Atlantis exemplifies the evolution of a society that eventually becomes unified and recognizes a social consciousness or “Man-soul.” Atlantean citizens subordinated individual to social desires and celebrated a perception of being “uniquely one with all Nature, the consummate product of her creative evolution” (p. 72). They understood the nuances of evolution and recapitulation and were devoted to preserving those processes. The fall of Atlantis was not cataclysmic, but rather a gradual degeneration initiated by forces of individualism and by physical changes in the environment. Social institutions such as medicine decayed as citizens and physicians violated communal health regulations for personal profit; law, religion, education, science, and the family faltered similarly. At the same time Atlantis began to sink into the sea, and its citizens either drowned or embarked on sea journeys in search of new land.

Although not the sole focus of the story, science was lauded as foremost among the achievements of Atlantis. Scientific discoveries had yielded means for the chemical synthesis of diamonds and gold, generation of life from crystals, accumulation of data on Martians, and the development of new vegetation. But these and other advances were not the reason for the elevated status of research. In Atlantis research was the ultimate expression of the belief in human improvement. And of all scientific endeavors, psychology represented the most valuable task. After a speculative period, the field had emancipated itself from metaphysics and physiology and “had become a culminating academic theme, the only one which all desired and which it was felt needful to know. It was genetic, comparative, clinical, and strove chiefly to give self-knowledge and self-control” (pp. 57–58). Researchers of this synthetic psychology were exonerated from many social duties, supported for their work, and “regarded as the light and hope of the state” (p. 56). Psychology was instrumental to the attainment of the perfect social order; and the psychologist occupied a social role consistent with the special obligations of the field.

The elevated position of psychology was apparent throughout the Atlantean civilization. Jurisprudence was designed through research on human nature and operated with two rules: the pleasure and pain principles and the assessment of the social value of individual actions. Education was structured according to human development research, and in the universities “the nature of man was the culminating study” (p. 34). Even teachers of religion, the “heartformers,” practiced a “higher psychology of the folk soul” (p. 80).

The tragedy of Atlantis was not a finality because there were survivors who potentially could transmit the Atlantean heritage and strive for some future utopia. The fall had resulted partly from the psychological flaws of individualism and selfishness, and the revered field of psychology did not escape these faults. In the midst of Atlantis’ degeneration, psychology was employed “to fit men to be cogs in preexisting machinery” rather than to “develop ever higher powers in man himself which impel him to create ever newer and higher institutions as progress demands” (p. 66). The commercial preoccupations of scientists signaled the eventual demise of the scientific spirit and the collapse of research centers.

Hall’s utopian conception of psychology is reflected in many of his psychological writings. In his psychology as well as in his administrative and educational efforts, Hall lauded research as the “greatest achievement of man” and the researcher as a “superman” who deserved extensive freedom and support (Hall, 1908, p. 104). His later writings emphasized not only the privileges of researchers but their leadership responsibilities: “Henceforth, as never before, progress is committed to the hands of the intellectuals and they must think harder, realizing to the full the responsibilities of their new leadership. . . . In everything it is the expert who must say the final word” (1921, pp. 112–113). If
scientific researchers had such responsibilities, then psychologists, who studied what Hall called the queen of the sciences, certainly held a substantial share of the duties. The special responsibilities of psychologists included the discovery of desirable human attributes and methods for readjusting the environment to human needs (Hall, 1917, 1919a, 1919b, 1923). As "queen of the sciences" psychology would promote the unity of knowledge, would bridge pure and practical research, and would embrace a pluralism of systems (Hall, 1906, 1908, 1919b, 1920b, 1923). Accordingly, he called the psychologist "a sort of high priest of souls" who "is not content merely to fit men for existing institutions as they are to-day" but would "develop even higher powers, which gradually melt old and evolve new and better institutions or improve old ones" (1923, p. 436). Here he also commented on the degradation of American science, particularly psychology; he compared intelligence testing to the fads of phrenology and palmistry and described it as a product solely of psychologists' economic interests.

The correspondence between Hall's utopian ideals and his psychological writings is represented through four basic assumptions about human nature. He held (1899, 1904) that human evolution is the growth of consciousness (individual and racial) and is progressive (upward). Further, evolution of the race is repeated in the individual; that is, it involves recapitulation (1904) and occurs in all human aggregates from the family to knowledge systems (1907, 1913). Finally, as the highest life form, humans are responsible for guarding and guiding evolution, and those in leadership positions have the greatest responsibility (1907, 1908, 1917, 1919a, 1919b, 1921, 1923). Because evolution is of consciousness, occurs throughout all human institutions, and requires guidance, psychology is a priority science and the logical source of coordination. With these responsibilities the psychologist, or psychological pedagogue, becomes the "engineer in the domain of nature" (Hall, 1919b, p. 99). Thus, Hall's assumptions about human nature justify the unique moral responsibilities associated with psychology.

William McDougall and Eugenics for Social Improvement

William McDougall was British by birth, but his career as a psychologist was spent equally in Britain and the United States. Although critical of McDougall's teleological thinking and interest in psychical research, histories of psychology present his scientific work as both innovative and influential. He has been credited with anticipating the behaviorist trend later promulgated by Watson, and his research in purposive psychology and instincts has earned him recognition as the progenitor of the hormic school of psychology. Yet, these accounts pay little attention to his social psychology, evolutionary theory, and psychology of politics and social ethics (see, e.g., Murphy, 1949; Peters, 1962; R. I. Watson, 1971).

One of his neglected publications, "The Island of Eugenia," is a proposal for a utopian society founded on eugenic principles (McDougall, 1921). Eugenia is presented as the plan of an academic scientist who, after 30 years of study, shared his ideas with an old college friend who since had become an affluent philanthropist. The plan is laid out in a dialogue between scientist and philanthropist, between the "Seer" and the "Practical Man." Eugenia would be devoted to propagating "superior strains," which are recruited worldwide on the basis of family history, intellectual abilities, and moral qualifications. Candidates for citizenship would be selected for superb phenotypic characteristics that supposedly represent exceptional genotypic traits, and some preference would be accorded to preserve the "disappearing" race of Nordics.

The story resembles the typical utopia in the sense that Eugenia would have an ideal geography and stable organization. However, only the measures for world improvement, for the social environment, and for the role of scientific institutions are presented in any detail. The program for human improvement is twofold. The selected breeders of Eugenia may reenter the general society to raise genetic fitness by intermarriage or to apply their superior talents to improve social and political conditions. Or Eugenians may marry within the utopia and contribute to genetic refinement. Thus, Eugenia would not be a utopia for everyone, but would admit a select group who aim to advance the lives of all. The scenic physical environment would comprise a conducive atmosphere for optimal work productivity, monogamous marriages, traditional family life, and education.

Just as the design of Eugenia required the knowledge of the scientific "Seer," so the maintenance of the island depended on science. The protagonist, a scientist of nature and society, drafted plans consistent with his belief in the validity and efficacy of science and accordingly with a conviction that other reform measures (those endorsed by Carnegie and Rockefeller) were merely "social
The primary institutions in Eugenia would be the universities and professional schools—places where research would flourish. Scientific studies would center on the science of Eugenia’s initial founding—psychology—particularly in its relations to eugenics. The extensive concern with human conditions and not social structure followed from the claim that “forms of organization matter little; the all important thing is the quality of the matter to be organized, the quality of the human beings that are the stuff of our nations and societies” (p. 7). Psychology, especially as it pertains to genetic issues, would have precedence: “The science of man will for the first time receive adequate recognition, that is to say, it will dominate the scene. To it all other sciences will be duly subordinated” (pp. 24–25).

McDougall’s plan for utopia parallels both his philosophy of knowledge and psychology. He had formulated a model of science in which the sole test of criterion of science, or true knowledge of Nature, is that it shall bring us such understanding of the course of natural events as will enable us effectively to intervene and modify the course of such events for our own purposes, direct the course of events teleologically, control them in some degree (however slight) in accordance with our desires and needs. (1934a, p. 15)

Science is an enactment of certain characteristics of human nature, specifically those of purposiveness. But McDougall also insisted that science is empirical and positive (1905, 1912, 1923) and can be distinguished from philosophy, which is criticism and evaluation (1929, 1934a). Of all the sciences, psychology is “the science of the most urgent importance in the present age, when, for lack of sufficient knowledge of human nature, our civilization threatens to fall into chaos and decay” (1930a, p. 221).

After rejecting mechanism and determinism, McDougall developed a purposive psychology with the underlying assumption that organisms have a “disposition” or latent tendency to strive toward some end (1908). He stipulated that the primary focus for psychology should be the study of particular dispositions or “instincts” and innate mental processes (1908, 1910, 1912) such as the hereditary basis of will (1912). He tentatively adopted a Lamarckian theory because it coincided with the premises of purposiveness, holism, and indeterminism (1925, 1929, 1930b, 1934a, 1934b, 1936). Because Lamarckianism stressed the salience of environmental and genetic influences on development, McDougall came to advocate both environmental and eugenic reforms (1921, 1931, 1933, 1934b).

As exemplified in his psychology, McDougall’s epistemology contains three root assumptions: mind evolves in a purposive manner toward some ideal end, science is a product of the evolution of mind, and the veracity of scientific knowledge is determined by its successful application (1905, 1923, 1934a, 1938). These assumptions imply that the ultimate purpose of science is the acquisition of knowledge for bettering humanity. They also assert the priority of psychology: If science results from purposive striving of mind, then scientists obviously would benefit from knowledge of purposiveness as investigated in psychology. Psychology is unique in its relevance to all facets of life and in its instrumental role in applying scientific knowledge to human affairs (1908, 1931, 1934b, 1937). McDougall consequently realized the need for better psychologists to “make themselves the saviors of our collapsing civilization” (1927, 1931, 1936). Psychology is essential to humankind’s continued progress and to the realization of higher ideals (1923, 1924, 1926, 1934a). Any contradiction between philosophical ideals and scientific facts was resolved by positing a special relation between philosophy and the social sciences. Under appropriate conditions social scientists should implement philosophers’ specifications for desirable ends or ultimate values. However, since the right conditions had not yet arrived and philosophical progress still required scientific support, there must be a different relation between the two fields. McDougall suggested that “It is, then, right and well nigh inevitable that the social scientist shall be also a philosopher, or, at least, interested in social philosophy and its problems” (1937, p. 342). Under such conditions the social scientist is responsible for promoting the progress and ideals of humankind; McDougall broached these responsibilities through his research and fiction.

Hugo Münsterberg and an Ideal Tomorrow

Hugo Münsterberg has been most commonly identified as William James’ chosen successor as head of the Harvard psychological laboratories. Although conventional histories acknowledge his early psychological theory and diversified interests, recognition of these contributions is tempered with expressed disappointment concerning Münsterberg’s performance as an experimental psychologist. With the exception of a recent biography
One of Münsterberg's attempts to unite political convictions, scientific beliefs, and metaphysics appears in a book-length utopian program published in the last year of his life. *Tomorrow: Letters to a Friend in Germany* (1916) proposes social perfection through attainment of postwar internationalism. The program is delineated in a series of letters from a German-American psychologist to a friend and historian in Germany who has requested the scientist's expertise. At the outset, the psychologist acknowledged the circumstances that permitted him to comment on the future: "You turn to me because one whose lifework is psychology may best foresee the days which wait for us, and one who lives in a neutral country may look with clearer eyes toward the tomorrow than those in belligerent lands" (p. 2). The utopian future, or tomorrow, is the ultimate consequence of the social advances from nationalism and internationalism to pacifism. These social changes require organized and efficient procedures implemented through acceptance of certain eternal and absolute values—through idealism. The nationalism of European countries, particularly Germany, and of America comprised the first signs of a new philosophy and ultimately, of a new world order. This nationalism fosters unity, which in turn would negate selfish individualism and engender the recognition of other absolute values. *Tomorrow* outlines the stages accompanying the realization of idealism. The supraindividual and future-oriented obligations eventually would serve not a single nation, but the entire world; all nations would "repress" memories of earlier animosities, would organize programs for exchange, cooperation, and other common purposes, and would constitute the beginnings of "supernational organizations" (pp. 224-242). The book concludes with a prospectus on postwar reconstruction oriented toward absolute ideals. "If the people of a group, or finally of the globe, are bound by an organization, it demands in the same way that each subordinate its selfish desires to the progress of the whole, to the aims of western culture, to the ideals of mankind" (pp. 267-268).

According to the plan of *Tomorrow*, science would serve these universal ideals. Science, particularly psychology, would contribute directly to these ends: "Movements for vocational guidance and vocational education have spread over the land. . . . The scientific expert is more and more often called into the service of public affairs" (pp. 153-154). Although *Tomorrow* contains numerous references to such psychological expertise, it is primarily an idealist scheme. It is written from the position that current scientific knowledge is faulty and that proper science requires a certain philosophical understanding. The narrator rejects contemporary speculations of a future based solely on scientific advances and argues that science is ancillary to absolute knowledge.

Münsterberg's other writings both correspond to the utopia and further explicate his ideals for science, specifically psychology. Münsterberg referred to experimental psychology as "causal" because it is "a science which aims at description and explanation of inner life" through study of the causal connections of its physical correlates (1910b, p. 26; 1914). But experimental psychology had limited potential and required another type of research (1898, 1899a, 1899b, 1914). "Purposive" psychology studies the same inner experiences as experimental psychology but from the "different standpoint" of understanding the meaning or purposes of inner experiences (1914, p. 297). Beginning where causal psychology terminates, purposive psychology alone can study the absolute ideals of life. Despite this dichotomous model, Münsterberg believed that both psychologies shared an ultimate end since "The whole elaboration of causal psychology, and that is after all the form of psychology which is traditionally accepted as the science of the mind, has significance only if it is ultimately to serve our practical ends" (1914, pp. 345-346). Münsterberg held that observable social degeneration and the demands made by other professionals for psychological expertise demonstrated "the duty of the practical psychologist systematically to examine how far other purposes of modern society can be advanced by the new methods of experimental psychology" (1913, p. 15). Psychology was imperative to successful social control and an ideal social order, and Münsterberg made numerous efforts to realize this potential through both his applied and experimental psychology. Finally, the application of psychology was essential to his idealist stance because the coupling of theory and practice represented a move toward a higher unity, "an ultimate view of pulsating reality" (1914, p. 17). Thus the process of application requires awareness of certain ultimate
ends or values—of purposive psychology—and a synthesis of theory and these socially desired ends (1909, 1910a).

The claims that psychology is essential to the success of modern life and that psychologists have unique obligations in serving society are consistent with Münsterberg's theory of knowledge. He held that there exists an absolute knowledge which transcends individual knowledge. The values of truth, beauty, harmony, progress, morality, and unity are subject to "the ultimate demand that all the values become one, that the world remain absolutely itself; and the satisfaction of this demand brings us the values of religion and philosophy" (1906, p. 40; see also 1899b, 1912). The classification and analysis of knowledge are determined on metaphysical and not physical grounds, through philosophical understanding and not experiences in the physical world. From this position it becomes evident that even the causal sciences are purposive and value-laden because they contribute to constructing an ideal system of the world (1911). The ultimate goal of knowledge seeking is the culmination of a "Weltanschauung, a unified view of the whole of reality" (1905, p. 95). Both purposive and causal psychology are essential to the study of absolute values and ends; the melding of these two approaches into applied psychology serves the striving for a harmonious social order and a unified system of knowledge.

John B. Watson and the Hopes of Behaviorism

John B. Watson is noted for his zealous commitment to psychology and his role as a proponent of what was to become for a time its foremost theoretical orientation. He also is credited with persuasively arguing against the validity of consciousness and introspection as psychological concepts, and for the study of behavior, the use of objective methods, the recognition of environmental influences on behavior, and the practical application of psychological research. Of these kudos, conventional histories mention little about his dedication to practical psychology (e.g., Boring, 1950; R. I. Watson, 1971).

Among the products of Watson's interest in the practical applications of psychology that have not received attention is a utopian vision based on behaviorist principles. Originally titled "The Behaviorist's Utopia," the manuscript was published in 1929 as a magazine article titled "Should a Child Have More Than One Mother?" Watson envisioned a thoroughly behavioristic country with "units" of 260 husbands and wives (and a few extras to serve as "spare" husbands and wives). Each husband and wife pair, aided by a "scientifically trained assistant," cares for three children, although they never know the identity of their biological children. Offspring rotate among the parent pairs, spending four weeks at each home, and at the age of 20, "his 260th mother and father pat him on the head and send him out to earn his living unaided" (p. 33). Eschewing religion, politics, philosophy, history, and tradition, Utopia's citizens seek only "behaviorist happiness," and do so "by experimentation." Utopia contains both accepted social traditions and innovations. Watson decreed that the country would be monogamous or "at any rate, I want to see monogamy tried" (p. 32). The social structure is unique in the absence of a "state," judicial system, and clergy. Because social rules are developed through experimentation and misbehavior is corrected by retraining, the behaviorist's utopia has no need for political structures or "that abstract entity we call the State" (p. 35). Citizens contribute to society because they are trained to be independent and absorbed in activities such that in the factories "men work harder if anything because they are trained to be absorbingly active all during the waking hours" (p. 32).

Instead of the usual professionals, Utopia has specialists called "behaviorist physicians" who are trained in the methods of behaviorism to "guard the community on the psychological side just as they guard it on the medical side. There is a preventive psychology in Utopia just as there is a preventive medicine" (p. 34). Among their responsibilities, behaviorist physicians correct behavior disorders, make decisions regarding euthanasia, and treat insanity. In a society where the rearing of children is paramount, the behaviorist physician "takes charge" and assists the mother during the early years of the children's lives. The educational environment is designed for conditioning "emotional and dispositional habits" and is equipped with such unobtrusive observational devices as periscopes. Children begin vocational and professional training at the age of 16 when, segregated by sex, males learn vocations such as medicine, science, and manufacturing while females learn to manage homes, handle men, perfect sex techniques, and rear children. Behavioral scientists apparently do not alter the social and moral standards precisely because such standards are identical with
those of behavioral science. Both are behavioristic and without complications inherent in religious, philosophical, or political traditions; both embrace the Utopian morals of "behavioristic happiness."

Watson's utopian stance on the necessity of psychology appears in other nonfictional writings. Before elucidating his "principles for the control of human action," and even before issuing his behaviorist decree of 1913, Watson expounded on the practical value of experimentation (1910, 1912). He subsequently described the goal of research to be the discovery of adjustments to stimuli, adding that "My final reason for this is to learn general and particular methods by which I may control behavior" (1913, p. 168). The control of behavior to "aid organized society in its endeavors to prevent failures" was just as much a function of psychology as the formulation of laws of behavior (1917a, p. 329). He argued that society's leaders had attempted environmental adjustment through "roundabout, hit-and-miss methods," whereas behavior psychology would do so by scientific methods (1917a, p. 330). Watson reiterated claims about the superiority of experimental methods for attaining social control and the need for trained behavior specialists (1919, 1920, 1924, 1928a, 1928b, 1928c).

In addition to the "essential contention" that psychology was a science (1913, p. 427), Watson held several basic assumptions that framed his aspirations for psychology. First, he refrained from compiling a taxonomy of simple and complex behaviors (which would have been a logical extension of his earlier work) in favor of classifying innate and acquired behaviors. This decision fit with his goals for psychology such that

when we are confronted with the practical and scientific needs of life we are ready to admit that after all what we seek to have psychology busy herself with is just this matter of environmental adjustment; what can man do apart from his training; what can he be trained to do, and what are the best methods for training; and finally, how, when the varied systems of instincts and habits have sufficiently developed, can we arrange the conditions for calling out appropriate action on demand? (1917a, p. 336)

The consequent research, however limited, led Watson to identify three innate emotions (1919, 1920) and to dismiss the study of inheritance as unnecessary (1924). Watson similarly declared that the study of human behavior involved the reduction of all complex behavior to simple actions (1928d) and that learning occurred in a critical period during the first two or three years of life (1928a, Watson & Watson, 1921).

Watson did not confirm these assumptions with experimental methods, although he believed confirmation was imminent (1921, 1925). Nevertheless, they were used to support a fundamental aim of his psychology: the control of human behavior. Watson's advocacy of a scientific method of social control had important and, as he occasionally recognized, troublesome limitations. He cautioned that psychology should refrain from framing moral rules or social values because "psychology at present has little to do with the setting of social standards of action and nothing to do with moral standards" (1917a, p. 329). Yet, on several occasions Watson acknowledged that if society established social standards by the same hit-and-miss methods that it implemented social control, then successful social standards would be developed only after an indeterminable time, if at all (1919, 1924). His attempts to resolve this problem included occasional abandonment of the prescribed neutral stance by discussing "behaviorist morals" (1927) and proposing that the scientific knowledge of behaviorists replace the legal system (1925). When Watson did maintain his conviction that psychology refrain from value judgments, he anticipated such judgments in a future "functional" or "experimental" ethics that would establish mores by scientific methods, by psychological experimentation (1917b, 1924, 1925). A final solution to the problem of the behaviorist's role in establishing moral standards was the creation of a society according to experimental findings. This solution was essentially an extension of Watson's famous statement, "Give me a dozen healthy infants, well-formed, and my own specified world to bring them up in and I'll guarantee to take anyone at random and train him to become any type of specialist I might select" (1928d, p. 10). He speculated on the feasibility of his "own specified world" with its potential contributions to social betterment and proposed several social experiments, including an "infant farm" for behavioral research (1920, 1928c; Watson & Watson, 1921) and a behaviorist's utopia.

On Utopia and Psychology

Hall, McDougall, Münsterberg, and Watson devised similar programs for psychology and psychologists in a utopian society. However, these similarities as well as their relation to comparable pre-
scriptions made by other psychologists first should be placed within a broader context of the evolving interplay between utopias and psychology.

Since More's design of the island of King Utopus, the utopian format has been used to describe a variety of extraordinary societies. Since the scientific revolution, most utopias have incorporated what has been called a "scientific imperative," a belief that utopia cannot carry on without science (Dubos, 1961; Eurich, 1967; Golffing & Golffing, 1971). A liberal form of the scientific method appeared when the 17th-century utopists rejected traditional knowledge of church and state and adopted a new epistemology. They held that knowledge could be acquired by humans through empirical methods using sensate experience to observe, record, and analyze human conditions. Just as the 18th- and 19th-century utopists continued this fascination by exploiting ideas from the physical sciences, so late 19th- and early 20th-century utopists contemplated the sciences of humankind (R. P. Adams, 1949; Manuel, 1965; Passmore, 1970; Roemer, 1976; Walsh, 1962).

Concepts and technical terminology borrowed from the burgeoning science of psychology supplied a means for making utopian fiction appear authentic and plausible. Notions of hypnotism, trance states, and brain surgery could explain how the narrator was transported to the new world (Bellamy, 1888; Merrill, 1899), and concepts of telepathy, clairvoyance, group mind effects, mind-controlling drugs, prenatal education, and eugenic breeding could account for the protean powers of the utopian citizen (Bulwer-Lytton, 1871; Gregory, 1918; Hudson, 1906; Lloyd, 1895; Taylor, 1901-1902). The continuing reliance on psychology for designing superlative societies and extraordinary beings prompted a historian of utopias to call recent utopian formulas "eupsychias" (Manuel, 1965).

The utopias of Hall, McDougall, Münsterberg, and Watson require analysis beyond a place in the development of eupsychias. These men were psychologists themselves, and in addition to joining the ranks with other psychological thinkers who prepared utopian speculations, such as Leibnitz, Turgot, Comte, Galton, Tarde, and Haldane, they were unique in their tendentious belief that their own profession was absolutely essential to improving society. The seriousness of this belief is evidenced in the correspondence between their utopian visions and many of their scientific and professional writings.

What has no obvious place in histories of utopias and is absent from conventional histories of psychology is an examination of these four utopias and similar convictions about psychology that were not presented in the utopian genre. Consequently, conventional histories of psychology omit psychologists' speculations on psychology's potential power in the reconstruction of American society. Admittedly, Bacon's elaborate plans for Salomon's House show that prescribing a structured role for science is not new to utopian thinking. But the human sciences, psychology in particular, had never before received such attention in utopias; the resemblance between the ideas of the four psychologists—utopists and many of their contemporaries intimates several distinct reasons for this new concern.

Reform, Social Control, and American Psychology

The American progressive era spanned the years from 1900 to 1917, a period when it had become increasingly evident to many Americans that the nation's growth had not always been equitable, moral, or without adverse costs. The realization ushered in a series of reforms, often organized by citizens and marked by beliefs in efficient and orderly social progress, equality, national unity, and citizen participation (Gould, 1974; Hofstadter, 1955, 1963; Wiebe, 1967). The perceived decline in enthusiasm for reform during World War I typically is interpreted as a marker for the end of the progressive era. However, interpreting postwar disillusionment as the terminus of these social reforms obscures half of what Morton White (1957) has labeled the "double effect" of the war: a renewed optimism regarding reform. In fact, of all the histories of the 1920s none give interpretations as optimistic as those accounts written in the decade itself (May, 1956).

Nevertheless, the war had brought a shift in reform involvement when the new specialties and techniques anticipated by prewar progressives were actually tested. The progressives had asserted the eventual necessity for scientific guidance in social and political life (Furner, 1975; Haber, 1964; McCraw, 1974; Wiebe, 1967), but the war propelled scientific research and eventually corrobated the idea, held by scientists and laypersons that specialists had a fundamental role in the future of America (Dupree, 1957; Kaplan, 1956; Tobey, 1971; Yerkes, 1920).

The assertion that scientific techniques implemented and administered by scientific experts
were essential to realizing social reforms is evident in many of the writings of Hall, McDougall, Münsterberg, and Watson. Especially in their utopias, these four psychologists advocated social change according to the wisdom of their science and the guidance of its experts. Their speculations were shared by other intellectuals, by trained psychologists, and by the average citizen, all of whom appeared to be captivated by the dazzle of the new scientific psychology. Even acrimonious commentators such as Floyd Dell (1926) lauded the new scientific professionals who “undertake therapeutically the tasks of bringing harmony, order and happiness into inharmonious, disorderly and futile lives” (p. 248). Other social critics and intellectuals also believed that scientists, notably from the human sciences, would provide what Walter Lippmann (1922) described as leadership by “interposing some form of expertise between the private citizen and the vast environment in which he is entangled” (p. 368). And John Dewey (1922) concurrently announced that bettering of democracy and social relations depended on the growth of a “scientific social psychology” (p. 323). Like many natural scientists of the period (Tobey, 1971), American intellectuals thought that society would move toward efficiency, order, and unity. Science, guided by expert minds, would enable the control of social phenomena, primarily by adjusting people to their changing environment. They shared with philosopher F. C. S. Schiller (1924) the hope that “a pragmatically efficient psychology might actually invert the miracle of Circe, and really transform the Yahoo into a man” (p. 64).

Concurrent with these more or less enlightened mandates grew a keen interest in psychology among the populace. Articles on personality, mental tests, psychoanalysis, hormonal processes (gland psychology), and behaviorism were consumed with such fervor by the lay public (G. Adams, 1934; Hart, 1933) that one historian called the preoccupation a “national mania” (Leuchtenburg, 1955, p. 164). Along with all its novelties and promises, the new psychology also captivated those Americans of the 1920s who were enraptured by the personal, by the “cult of the self” (Baritz, 1960; Burnham, 1968).

Psychologists were not excluded from such discussions on the prospects for psychology and social improvement. Although traditional histories view the period as one of theoretical fermentation and the accumulation of scientific techniques, other historical studies suggest that at least some of these conventional images of psychology as an experimental science often served personal and political interests (Danziger, 1979; O’Donnell, 1979). More recent studies have found that, at least after the war, psychologists were as concerned with applied issues as with experimentalism (Camfield, 1969, 1973; O’Donnell, 1979; Samelson, 1978) and were enmeshed in economic, occupational, and political realities of their discipline (Danziger, 1979; Samelson, 1975, 1978, 1979; Sokal, 1980, 1981).

These activities within the psychological community reveal a commitment to an ordered and efficient society and a belief in the possibility of developing scientific measures of control, specifically through the appropriate psychological adjustment of individuals to the environment. This conviction implied that psychologists could and should contribute by extending their scientific expertise to the management of society. In the words of James McKeen Cattell (1926), “Scientific men should take the place that is theirs as masters of the modern world” (p. 8). Applied psychology textbooks published between 1925 and 1938 give ample evidence of these appeals for a well-adjusted society, the development of personalities suited to the social order, and public recognition of the essential participation of psychologists in such efforts (Napoli, 1980).

Psychologists with reputations as experimentalists were not exempted from making these appeals for reform. For example, Knight Dunlap (1928) endorsed the development of social psychology primarily in terms of its potential contribution to understanding social problems (p. 355). Floyd Allport (1924) devoted a major portion of his text, Social Psychology, to the study of social control, which he thought corresponded with the “basic requirements for a truly democratic social order” (p. 415). Because psychology was seen as integral to implementing reform measures, many psychologists acknowledged the social responsibility of members of their science: “It is the outstanding feature of our reconstructed psychology that it realized and accepted the obligation to apply . . . the conclusions arising from the study of the mental side of man” (Jastrow, 1927, p. 170). Joseph Jastrow (1928) accordingly argued that the psychologist “should join the small remnant of creative and progressive thinkers who can see even this bewildering world soundly and see it whole. Such is part of the psychologist’s responsibility” (p. 436). When writing on social reform in the 1920s and psychologists’ fundamental part in it,
Jastrow conceded that he was "not optimistic enough to indulge in Utopias" (p. 436), so his proposals were prepared in the format of professional commentary. Just as clinicians and applied psychologists contemplated the future social adjustments and the reconstruction of society, so experimental psychologists made comparable propositions despite the fact that they may not have been directly involved in such applications. To this list must be added the names of Hall, McDougall, Münsterberg, and Watson: Their utopias comprise entertaining pronouncements on psychology’s ultimate contribution to a better society and the techniques that should be implemented by psychological experts.

A Dual Morality and the Function of More Critical Thinking

Utopias become excellent vehicles for exploring the utility of scientific knowledge because they implicitly demand the “application” of knowledge to improving society. The fictions of Hall, McDougall, Münsterberg, and Watson expose Baconian thinking about a science in the service of society. Analysis of these Baconian statements has revealed that, despite disparate psychological theories, the four psychologists shared a vision for an ordered, harmonious, and unified society in which psychology is a special science and in which psychologists provide expert leadership and implement scientific measures of social control. Without embarking on fiction, other psychologists suggested similar measures. These findings stand in contrast to the conventional accounts of psychology’s scientific achievements and striving toward an objective and experimental enterprise, and they contribute to a largely untold story about American psychology in the decade following World War I. The utopias and the nonutopian proposals for reconstructing American society both affirm the existence of a dichotomy between Baconian and Newtonian thinking and exemplify the dangers of such a dichotomy. The social ideals of these psychologists mirrored popular notions of reform. It is interesting and alarming to discover that, regardless of grossly different assumptions about human nature and the appropriate form for psychological inquiry, psychologists essentially concurred about the social ends that psychology should serve. There existed implicit agreement that psychology was a technique in the service of particular ends. Such a Baconian and Newtonian dichotomy of values suggests two dangers. It perpetuates the utilization of psychology in ways relatively outside the province of psychologists’ activities and thus augments their unsophisticated and perhaps credulous acceptance of such utilization. It also heightens the probability that novel or creative ideas succumb to the expediency of other objectives. Not the least of neglected ideas are the attempts to confront psychology’s moral dualism in the utopias presented above. Although not a subject of the present study, even a cursory examination of Münsterberg’s proposal for both an objective and purposive psychology, Hall’s genetic epistemology, and McDougall’s model relating psychology and social philosophy illustrates how potential innovations can be buried by externally- or pre-determined objectives.

This study has not attempted to trace the persistence of a dual morality in thinking about psychology nor has it sought to formulate alternatives to the dualism. Anyone familiar with the subtleties of psychology’s most noted utopia (Skinner, 1948) and the author’s later expositions of its premises (Skinner, 1971, 1981) can appreciate the complexities inherent in such tasks. However, on another front an increasing number of researchers are exploring this duality and its consequences. They are examining how psychology’s moral heritage has been obscured by 20th-century attempts to devise an objective science (Leary, 1980), the extrascientific determinants of research (Cowan, 1977; Gorman, 1981; Morawski, 1979; Samelson, 1979, 1980; Steiner, 1974; Steininger, 1979), and the manners in which psychological questions have been pretermitted or disregarded (Apfelbaum & Lubek, 1976; Buss, 1975, 1977; Lubek, 1979). Such historical awareness has enabled other researchers to systematically examine how models of human nature and its potential have been construed by a tacit striving for relevance and agreement with prevalent social morality (Argyris, 1975; Gadlin & Ingle, 1975; Gergen, 1978; Gilligan, 1977; Hogan & Emler, 1978; Moscovici, 1972; Sampson, 1977, 1978; Sarason, 1981; Shotter, 1975).

The continuation of such critical thinking, both historical and interpretive, is imperative to the health and integrity of psychological knowledge (Samelson, 1980). It not only informs us about the social context of our research activities (Buss, 1975, 1979) but also can contribute to advances in research programs (Harré & Secord, 1972) and in metatheories (Gergen & Morawski, 1980; Israel, 1972; Morawski, in press; Rommetveit, 1976; Ros-
now, 1981; Sampson, 1978, 1981; Scheibe, 1979). Overall, more critical thinking can remind us of a persisting relation between utopias and science. In the words of a contemporary social critic, "A vision of a human future cannot do without the indispensable support of scientific expertise, but it encompasses more than the realm of science. The utopia without science is empty, but science without utopia is blind" (Plattel, 1972, p. 97).

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